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Chapter one: How should physicians be motivated to fulfill social obligations? 
Health, or at least freedom from acute or chronic pain, disability, or disease, is a 
condition of human flourishing. Human beings cannot attain their fullest potential 
without some significant measure of health. A good society is one in which each citizen 
is enabled to flourish, grow, and develop as a human being. 
-Edmund Pellegrino (1999, 259) 
Health is instrumental to the ability of individuals to fulfill their potential. The societal 
systems designed to nurture health are thereby particularly important both for the flourishing of 
the individual and that of society, for a society flourishes to the extent that each of its individual 
members flourishes. The medical professionals who strive to preserve good health in their 
communities through these systems are integral to the maintenance of a thriving society. They 
are the individuals most directly responsible for the quality of health care available to community 
members. It is their medical prowess and critical thinking skills that determine the effective 
elimination of disease through innovative treatment. Yet their contributions to healthy 
communities extend beyond their evident contractual relationships with patients. 
The commitment of medical professionals to engage in promoting health beyond their 
contractual responsibilities is key to the quality of health care vital to a flourishing society. 
Many physicians as medical professionals embrace these social responsibilities by voluntarily 
providing indigent care, engaging in clinical research, training the next generation of physicians 
and leading public health projects, to name a few examples. As this thesis will explore, their non-
contractual interactions are critical to the quality of health care provided in this country and 
contribute to the formation and maintenance of a society in which members enjoy a high 
standard of well-being. 
Furthermore, these non-contractual interactions may be even more pivotal in a capitalistic 
society where issues of health care access are distributed based on ability to pay. In such a 
society, a significant number of uninsured individuals means that these community members 
receive health care to·the extent that physicians and hospitals are willing to provide the care free 
of charge. In addition, though the care of individuals under public health insurance such as 
Medicare and Medicaid is more constant than for the uninsured, medical professionals and 
hospitals often treat these patients at a financial loss because government insurance rates do not 
cover the economic costs of the care provided. The commitment of some medical professionals 
to treat patients regardless of low or no reimbursement is critical to health care access for this 
population under the current social structure. 
Examples of such publicly minded physicians abound in health care practice as well as in 
other health-related areas such as clinical research, education, ethics and public health. The 
volunteer physicians at Crossover Ministry, a free clinic in Richmond, Virginia, are a case in 
point. Crossover Ministry has been providing health care for uninsured persons in need for over 
fifteen years. It is sustained by the financial support of the community and the labor of volunteer 
medical professionals. Over three hundred volunteers staff Crossover Ministry, including over 
two hundred medical professionals who see patients. These medical professionals consist of 
dental hygienists and dentists, nurses and nurse practitioners, physician assistants and over one 
hundred physicians. CrossOver Ministry is representative of many free clinics nationwide that 
utilize the voluntary services of medical professionals to help solve the problem of poor health 
care access. 
There are well over one thousand free clinics in the United States like Crossover 
Ministry that are providing free care to the indigent (Geller et al., 2004, 48). Such free clinics are 
"private, nonprofit, community or faith-based organizations that provide medical, dental, and 
mental health care and prescription medications at little or no charge to low-income, working 
people" (Connally, 2004, Al 7). The care these clinics offer benefits some of the estimated 43.6 
million Americans who are without health insurance (Geller et al., 2004, 48). As researchers 
studying free clinics in the Midwest have concluded, we "should recognize the important role 
that free clinics are playing in helping to patch the health care safety net" (Geller et al., 2004, 49-
50). The voluntary medical services provided by physicians at these free clinics play a pivotal 
role in alleviating health care access issues. 
Though 68% of doctors in a 2004-2005 study indicated that they provide some free or 
discounted care to patients of low socio-economic status, this number is down from 76% 
do<?umented. ten years previous (Connolly, 2006, A09). High medical school debt, busy 
schedules and lower reimbursements for services have all contributed to this decline in charity 
care (Connolly, 2006, A09). To compound the problem, as the percentage of physicians offering 
charity care has declined, the number of uninsured people in the United States has climbed to 
45.5 million in 2004 (Connolly, 2006, A09). In a country without a universal health care policy, 
access to health care for these 45.5 million uninsured is dependent upon the free or discounted 
care provided by physicians and hospitals. Though the number of physicians engaging in social 
responsibilities has declined, there are still many-physicians choosing to provide charity care 
despite these factors. 
The actions of these physicians who consistently volunteer their medical services raise 
questions about the duties of physicians. Are physicians only responsible for elevating health in 
the context of the contractual physician-patient relationship? Is there a boundary between a 
physician's patients and the rest of the community? And with respect to motivation, what should 
inspire these physicians to work beyond the boundaries of their patients in contributing to quality 
health care? 
Contractual versus non-contractual obligations 
The contractual physician-patient relationship, in many ways fundamental to the delivery 
of effective health care and the well-being of communities, is the focus of much academic 
writing in medicine. Scholars have debated the best model for this dyadic relationship, criticizing 
the extreme of a purely contractual/autonomy approach on the one hand to the extreme of a 
traditional, medical paternalism approach on the other (James, 1989, 142). Newer models such as 
the friendship model have attempted to strike a balance between these two extremes (James, 
1989, 142). The friendship model emphasizes the friendship between a physician and patient that 
is a consequence of a shared activity, namely the "joint participation in a search for the truth" in 
the case of preserving health (James, 1989, 144). The friendship model also stresses "the moral 
equality of the parties" as well as the integral role of trust between physician and patient as "both 
an inherent good and an instrumental good, because trust furthers the good of health" (James, 
1989, 145). Common to each of these models are the special obligations that arise within the 
contractual physician-patient relationship. These obligations, beyond the over-arching obligation 
to promote the health and well-being of the patient, include duties the physician holds to the 
patient such as well-adopted moral principles of truth-telling and promise-keeping as well as 
competence (Pellegrino, 1983, 194). 
While the contractual physician-patient relationship is the fundamental unit of health care 
distribution, "when the contract becomes the paradigm of a moral relationship, and the market 
the regnant model of a just community, much of what makes us human, and our communities 
livable, is excluded" (Murray, 1994, 32). Our communities are livable and our relationships 
human in large part because of the non-contractual interactions within a society, and in part 
because of the broader, non-contractual interactions of physicians with their communities. As 
this thesis will demonstrate, the contractual physician-patient relationship is greatly enhanced by 
the non-contractual responsibilities which the physician embraces. These non-contractual 
interactions extend beyond the care of the patient to include activities that promote the public 
heal th of the community. But how large is the scope of a community to which a physician is 
obligated? 
In Beleaguered Rulers, William May speaks of Aristotle's idea of the polis which was a 
good community of friends or people with shared interests and goals (2003, 29). This community 
was small enough to recognize all citizens by name, and to engage everyone in civic 
responsibility (May, 2003, 29). May further points out that in this global age, communities are 
widely interdependent and in today's "metropolises comprised of strangers," strangers connect 
through cash more often than shared interests (2003, 29). Given these circumstances, how should 
we define the communities to which physicians are socially obligated? As May points out, a 
community is no longer just a neighborhood. A community might mean a town, a city, a state, 
the nation, or the world. For the purposes of this thesis, one might call a community anything . 
outside of the one-on-one physician-patient relationship. Such a definition of community allows 
the moral obligations of a physician to be discharged at the local level or on a larger scale. For 
the purposes of this thesis, it is a broad enough definition to encompass most viewpoints with 
respect to the scope of the social responsibilities of physicians. 
In this thesis, social obligations of physicians are defined as non-contractual interactions 
of physicians with their communities in a manner that utilizes their medical knowledge and/or 
skills. Such actions might include, but are not limited to: providing health care to uninsured 
patients; engaging in the collection of data for another expert's clinical research; lobbying 
political organizations or government about health-related issues; educating community· 
members about medical prevention; curb-side consultation; training the next generation of 
physicians; serving on hospital review boards and ethics committees; providing emergency care; 
participating in medical missions trips; promoting public health. The scope of these social 
obligations ranges from the opinion that they are acts of charity to the opinion that they demand 
fulfillment as forcefully as a contract with a patient demands adherence. In contrast to the 
consensus on contractual obligations of physicians, there is less of a consensus regarding the 
nature and extent of the social obligations of physicians to their communities. While the scope of 
physicians' social obligations is debatable, most will agree that physicians do have social 
obligations. Literature relating the opinions of the medical community at large further 
corroborates this perspective. 
The medical community perspective on non-contractual obligations of physicians 
Medical schools make an effort to educate future physicians to be aware of their social 
responsibilities through ethics and humanities training as well as service-learning opportunities. 
Social responsibilities of physicians are addressed in the modem version of the Hippocratic Oath 
which is recited by graduating medical students to this day. The Hippocratic Oath has been 
described as .. a declaration of virtue based on faith and self-respect" (Marketos et al., 1996, 102). 
One statement in the Oath is recited as follows: "I will remember that I remain a member of 
society, with special obligations to all my fellow human beings, those sound of mind and body as 
well as the infirm" (Lasagna, 1964, 1 ). This statement implies that as a member of society, the 
physician has special obligations to all her fellow human beings, the healthy as well as the sick. 
By reciting the Hippocratic Oath, physicians are pledging themselves to uphold the 
responsibilities of the medical profession as stipulated in the Oath. Much as a political official 
would be bound by an oath of office, physicians ought to follow through with the promises they 
make to society by taking this oath. Though the Hippocratic Oath is still commonly recited, some 
critics question whether or not it is relevant to the modern-day context of medicine. Newer 
versions of the Oath like the one created by Lasagna in 1964 attempt to address these concerns. 
It could be argued that the Oath has become more of a tradition and less of an imperative for 
today's physicians. However, given its preponderance at medical school graduation ceremonies, 
it is still a good starting place for the grounds of physicians' social obligations as defined by the 
medical community. 
As Steven H. Miles points out in The Hippocratic Oath and the ethics of medicine, "The 
Oath notably promotes the principles of beneficence and justice ... pertain[ing] to the role of the 
physician as promoting health in society and engaging in matters of public health, human rights, 
and harmful ecological change" (2004, 181 ). The social obligations of physicians to engage in 
health matters beyond their relationships with their patients are not forgotten in this historical 
document. During Hippocrates' life, physicians in Greek society understood ~'that the physician-
citizenship role promoted the health of the citizens of a city-state, just as clinical work promoted 
the health of individuals" (Miles, 2004, 56). Thus the Greeks understood one role of medical 
providers as physician-citizens. In their role as physician-citizens, "Physicians treated people 
during epidemics ... [and] would have been expected to participate in public debates about the 
governance of Greek society" (Miles, 2004, 56). Times have not changed so drastically as to call 
into question the need for such fulfillment of social responsibilities in the context of medicine 
today. 
The medical community at large acknowledges social responsibilities as evidenced by the 
focus of the American Medical Association, the primary, prominent professional organization for 
physicians dedicated to helping doctors help patients and to improving the nation's health. The 
American Medical Association's Code of Medical Ethics addresses social obligations of 
physicians in its seventh principle: "A physician shall recognize a responsibility to participate in 
activities contributing to the improvement of the community and the betterment of public health" 
(E-1.001 Principles of Medical Ethics). This principle indicates that physicians have a duty to 
participate in community activities that are pertinent to health. However, the principle does not 
explicitly define the scope of these obligations. Others define social obligations of physicians as 
including "advocacy for and participation in improving the aspects of communities that affect the 
health of individuals" (Gruen et al., 2004, 94). More specifically with regard to care for the poor, 
the American Medical Association makes it clear that each physician has a responsibility to care 
for the indigent in his community. Gruen et al. reiterate that "all physicians have a primary 
ethical and professional responsibility for the health of the community members they serve" 
(2004, 94). Thus while there does not appear to be a clear consensus of what physicians' social 
obligations entail, there is a consensus on the existence of these obligations. 
But beyond the historical precedence of and contemporary commitment to these 
obligations, what are the grounds of the social responsibilities of the physician? For the purposes 
of this introduction, I will lay out one argument in particular. However, in this thesis, other 
arguments are addressed in the context of various ethical frameworks. 
An argument/or the non-contractual obligations of physicians 
A compelling argument for the grounding of the social obligations of physicians is found 
in the nature of the professions coupled with the operation of medicine in a capitalistic society. 
First, as a profession, physicians fall into the same category as lawyers and clergy who are 
dedicated to the ends of their professio.n to the extent that they serve beyond their contractual 
obligations. Literature on the professions places great emphasis on ethical ideals and service to 
others. For example, in The ends of human life: Medical ethics in a liberal polity, Ezekiel J. 
Emanuel writes that what sets apart the professions from other occupations is the emphasis on 
dedication to ethical ideals and service to the subjects for whose benefit the ideals are pursued 
(1991, 14 ). The professional should exhibit a concern for society as a whole and care for the best 
in a culture (Campbell, 1982). When an individual chooses to become a member of a profession, 
he is choosing to accept the profession's ends as his own ends. More specifically, ifhe chooses 
to become a physician, he is dedicating his career and knowledge towards the improvement of 
the health of his community. Acceptance of training and education from elders in the profession 
is acknowledgement of a dedication not only to master the skills of the profession, but to 
contribute towards the ends of the profession. Just as Donald Fleming states: "The practice of 
medicine is ... a treaty with society" (Crossover Ministry, 2003). Given this treaty with society, 
physicians must engage in the fulfillment of social obligations in order to contribute to the ends 
of the medical profession (Geiger, 1957, 89). As such, a physician dedicated to the health of her 
community cannot ignore the broader responsibilities she has to her community to further these 
ends beyond her contractual relationships with her patients. 
For the professional, service to others comes before the professional's gain. Consider 
Plato• s Republic in which Socrates discusses the nature of a craft and specifically the purpose of 
a physician: "Tell me: Is a doctor in the precise sense ... a money-maker or someone who treats 
the sick? Tell me about the one who is really a doctor" (Plato, 1992, 341 c ). Thrasymachus 
responds, "He's the one who treats the sick" (Plato, 1992, 341c). A craft's end, according to 
Socrates, is to provide what is advantageous to that craft (see chapter three of this thesis for an 
extended discussion). In other words, physicians are specifically poised to provide medical 
assistance, and thus the ends of the craft ought to focus on the needs of the people to whom 
physicians are providing assistance. Likewise with other professions, those who are really 
professionals place the importance of service to those receiving assistance before the importance 
of money-making. With these common values, lawyers, clergy, physicians and other 
professionals must, and many do, recognize the social responsibilities tied to their profession. 
Those in the medical field must recognize the instrumental value of fulfilling social 
obligations in making the ends of the medical profession their own ends. As Emanuel puts it with 
regards to the public health profession, "the public health professional's client is the general 
public and his primary end is promoting health of the general community" ( 1991, 16). The 
physician who is serving in the role of a public health professional must hold the health of the 
general community as a primary goal. As Burns states in his book entitled Leadership, 
"Leadership, unlike naked power-wielding, is thus inseparable from followers' needs and goals" 
( 1978, 19). The physician's exercise of leadership in society, rather than highlighting the 
selective use of medical knowledge and skills, must be focused on the health needs of the 
community being served. 
Secondly, physicians have social obligations particularly in the context of health care 
provision in a capitalistic economy. Medicine as a social good operates under conditions of 
scarcity; there are always more social needs than resources to satisfy them, more ailments to treat 
than physicians or medical supplies to treat them, and more people in need of care who cannot 
afford it. While government officials and public health specialists are trained to tackle these 
problems, the physician is in a unique position to contribute to the end goal of overall well-being 
as she is both a provider of medical care and an expert who understands the social factors which 
affect health. Physicians should harbor deep concerns about the state of health in their 
community and therefore must recognize a need to be actively involved in solutions as promoters 
of the public health. 
As physicians within their communities increasingly work to solve the health care 
problems of today, their involvement is chara~teristic of the changing attitudes regarding 
medicine. These physicians active in solving health care problems "are on the cutting edge of a 
new social philosophy that treats the challenge of rescuing sick children from the ravages of 
poverty as more of an art than a science" (Shore, 2001, 78). There is no comprehensive 
government solution to current health care problems on the horizon----no panacea to improving 
the health of our communities. But there are physician-artists who are at the forefront, creatively 
tackling these problems as they use their medical knowledge coupled with an understanding of 
social forces to discover solutions. 
As Bill Shore stated in The cathedral within: Transforming your life by giving something 
back, "Poverty's paradox is that it creates medical problems that can't be cured with medicine, 
so these doctors find themselves looking for vital signs that can't be found with a stethoscope: in 
household budgets, parent-child dynamics, and family histories" (2001, 74). In medical care 
there is an increasing focus on the wholistic care of patients that has broadened the scope of 
physicians' contractual obligations. In treating patients, physicians are more concerned than ever 
before about understanding the social factors in a patient's life which affect health. Similarly, a 
capitalistic society broadens the scope of medical social obligation·s, requiring physicians to care 
about more than the health of their patients. If health care was universal, and the transfer of 
medical knowledge contractual, one might be able to argue that the best means of discharging 
these responsibilities is through the physician-patient relationship. However, in the context of a 
capitalistic society, health care access is not universal and the transfer of medical knowledge is, 
in large part, dependent upon the non-contractual interactions among physicians. These 
conditions require the physician to embrace non-contractual obligations in order to further the 
ends of the profession, namely the health of society. 
In conclusion, a global world creates medical problems that cannot be cured solely from 
health care provided through the contractual physician-patient relationship. Physicians who 
embrace the ends of the profession and desire to elevate the health of their communities must 
look for vital signs outside of just the patients they treat. The health problems of today require 
creative solutions, and as physicians play an increasingly key role in this process, they continue 
to hone their skills as artists in addition to scientists. The physician-artist who is actively 
engaging in and contributing to health issues is pivotal to the well-being of her community. 
The motivational question 
As outlined above, physicians do have social responsibilities which are grounded in the 
nature of medicine as a profession and the current challenges of health care in a capitalistic 
society. On the assumption that there are such duties, the practical question then becomes one of 
motivation. 
There are health needs within society that can be met through physicians' fulfillment of 
their social responsibilities. There are many individuals who are uninsured or lack access to 
quality health care and are in need of assistance. There are emergencies in the form of natural 
disasters or human conflict that require the volunteer, immediate services of medical 
professionals. There are searches for cures for the prevalent diseases of our day which need the 
benefits of medical knowledge-sharing-whether physicians are in consultation with each other 
about a particular patient, or whether a physician is collecting clinical data for a study. There are 
politicians forming health care policies that require the involvement of physicians in order to 
reflect a well-informed and innovative perspective. There are physicians training to be 
tomorrow's leading health care providers who need the mentoring of today's experts. In all these 
scenarios, the well-being of society is enhanced by those physicians fulfilling their social 
responsibilities. 
Physicians do have social obligations and health needs in society are addressed when 
they act upon them. If we care about these duties, then we must also care about physicians 
fulfilling them. But it is not enough to praise the fulfillment of duty without regard for the 
motivation behind it. Not only do we want these duties fulfilled, but we want them fulfilled for 
the right reasons. The practical question following an assumption of these duties becomes a 
moral question about motivation-how should physicians be motivated to fulfill social 
obligations? 
This thesis is based on the assumption that physicians do have social obligations that 
extend beyond their contractual, dyadic obligations towards their patients such as providing 
indigent care, lobbying politicians, promoting public health or collecting data for research. While 
this thesis will address the various grounds of these social obligations, the grounds of these broad 
responsibilities of physicians will not be its main focus. Rather, starting from this premise, the 
thesis will ask the related, nonnative question: how should physicians be motivated to fulfill 
social obligations? While the grounds behind the premise of medical social obligations are 
fundamental, the motivations of physicians who are fulfilling these obligations are of great 
practical importance. An understanding of motivation allows one to ask, what are those shared 
beliefs and values common to the medical profession, and how can they be used as sources of 
motivation in the fulfillment of social responsibilities? 
This thesis specifically addresses how physicians should be motivated to fulfill their 
social obligations by considering four prominent categories of motivation. Chapter two looks at 
the physician who is motivated to fulfill social obligations just because it is the right thing to do. 
The moral value of such duty-based motivations is considered, drawing heavily from Immanuel 
Kant's Foundations of the metaphysics of morals (1969). Chapter three discusses the physician 
who is motivated to fulfill social obligations out of self-interest. The grounds of social 
obligations of physicians are established from the responsibility to fulfill the ends of the medical 
profession as defined in Plato• s Republic ( 1993 ). Additionally,· the distinction between selfish 
and self-interested motivation is drawn. Chapter four looks at the physician who is motivated to 
fulfill social obligations because she feels compassion for others. The moral value of such 
sympathy-based motivations is considered, reflecting upon Martha Nussbaum's Compassion and 
terror (2003). Chapter five describes the moral worth of religious beliefs that motivate 
physicians to fulfill social obligations. Specifically, the grounds of the Christian physician's 
obligations are established from the love commandments and the parable of the Good Samaritan. 
Religious motivations are found to be morally worthy in inspiring extensive compassion and 
sustaining self-interested religious identity. 
In addition to the philosophical components of this thesis, an empirical research study 
conducted at Crossover Ministry informs this normative evaluation with answers to the question, 
how are medical professionals motivated to volunteer their services? This empirical study 
surveyed volunteer medical professionals who provide charity care at this free clinic in 
Richmond, VA. Out of 175 surveys distributed, a total of 105 medical professionals responded 
{response rate: 60%). Of these 105 medical professionals, 54 were physicians and the remaining 
51 practitioners included nurses, opthalmologists, physical therapists and physician assistants. 
The survey questioned respondents about their motivations to volunteer their medical services at 
Crossover Ministry (for a copy of the survey, refer to Appendix A). Each of the four motivations 
of duty, self-interest, compassion and religious motivation was composed of a number of items. 
The reliability of each scale was tested to see if people made similar responses to all the items 
within a category of motivation. Indeed, after minor adjustment, all were sufficiently reliable. 
Results of the study are incorporated throughout this thesis in the context of the discussion of the 
moral worth of each motivation. 
Understanding how physicians should be motivated to fulfill their social responsibilities 
holds great practical value in encouraging all physicians to engage in such activities. 
Chapter two: Motivated to fulfill social obligations out of duty 
Physicians, when asked what motivates them to fulfill social obligations specific to the 
medical profession, sometimes respond that they are motivated out of a sense of duty or that they 
act because they feel it is the right thing to do. Motivations of this type are not unlike the Kantian 
ethic which prescribes that acts of moral worth must be done out of a sense of duty. This chapter 
looks at the moral worth of duty-based motivations founded on Immanuel Kant's Foundations of 
the metaphysics of morals. Section one of this chapter outlines the Kantian grounds of the social 
obligations of physicians according to Kant's first and second versions of the categorical 
imperatives. Section two extrapolates from Kant's account to how physicians should be 
motivated. Section three then critiques Kant's assessment of motivation on the basis that his 
assessment discounts morally relevant motivations which inspire the fulfillment of duty. This 
chapter lays the foundation for the argument of this thesis, namely that there are other 
motivations outside duty that are morally worthy in the fulfillment of social obligations. 
Compared to Kant's conception of morally worthy motivations, this thesis proposes a more 
liberal standard for the evaluation of the morality of required actions done in accordance with 
duty. 
The grounds of the social obligations of physicians according to 
Kant's first categorical imperative 
For Immanuel Kant, "nothing in the world ... can possibly be conceived which could be 
called good without qualification except a good wilr (Kant, 1969, 11 ). Only the good will as 
directed by reason is capable of defining the moral worth of an action. Thus reason's 
determination of one's duty may be derived from application of the first version of Kant's 
categorical imperative: "Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time 
will that it should become a universal law'' (Kant, 1969, 44). For Kant, when actions are 
performed according to a principle that one could will to be applied universally, duty is fulfilled. 
Kant further distinguishes "stricter or narrower (imprescriptible) duty" from "broader 
(meritorious) duty" (Kant, 1969, 48). Strict duties include those of a contractual nature such as 
the duty to fulfill promises or the duties of physicians to patients. For example, to determine if 
we have a strict duty to fulfill promises according to Kant, we must try to imagine a world in 
which everyone does not fulfill their promises. Because promises in such a world would have no 
worth, this kind of world cannot be imagined and so it would produce a conceptual contradiction. 
From this inconsistency we can deduce that we have a strict duty to fulfill our promises. Strict 
duties are determined through such contradictions in conception in applying Kant's first 
categorical imperative. The strict duties of physicians to patients can also be derived in this 
manner. First, we must try to imagine a world in which physicians do not fulfill their duties to 
patients. Because such a physician-patient relationship would not be founded on trust and the 
delivery of health care would be inconsistent, such a world cannot be imagined. More generally, 
if we try to imagine a world in which no one kept their contractual obligations, this would be 
impossible because much as with the example of fulfilling promises, contracts would have no 
worth. From these contradictions in conception, we can deduce that physicians have a strict duty 
to fulfill their obligations to patients. 
Those required actions committed from a sense of meritorious duty include broad duties 
to oneself such as cultivating talents, and broad duties to others such as the obligation to help 
people. In applying Kant's categorical imperative, broad duties are determined not through 
contradictions in conception but through contradictions in will. Consider two examples of the 
determination of broad duties according to Kant. In order to determine ifwe have a broad duty to 
self, we must attempt to will a world in which no one fulfilled this duty to themselves. Then we 
must see if willing to not fulfill this duty to self would produce a contradiction with another 
willed behavior to the self. For example, while we might be able to conceive of a world in which 
no one cultivated his talents, the question for broader duties then becomes, can we will such a 
world? According to Kant, a man cannot will a universal law of failing to develop talents, "For, 
as a rational being, he necessarily wills that all his faculties should be developed, inasmuch as 
they are given to him for all sorts of possible purposes" (1969, 47). Rationality demands the 
pursuit of ends, and one needs talents in this pursuit. Therefore, a rational being cannot will a 
universal law of failing to develop talents, for willing to fail to develop his own talents would be 
in contradiction with his will to pursue his own ends. Applying this concept of broad duties to 
the self, a physician must will to develop her own medical skills in so far that she wishes to 
pursue the ends of a successful medical practice in her community. 
Beyond such broad duties to the self in the pursuit of one's own ends, Kant further 
discusses broad duties to others in the pursuit of social ends. The contradiction in will is derived 
in a different manner with respect to these duties to others as compared to broad duties to the 
self. For example, with regards to helping behavior and the first version of Kant's categorical 
imperative, it might be possible to imagine a world in which no one helped anyone else. One 
could conceive of such a world, but could one will such a world? Kant argues that everyone 
needs help at one point or another, and thus to will for someone to help you at a given time and 
also to will that no one help anyone else is a contradiction. The contradiction in will derives from 
willing that everyone (which must include the self) engage in the behavior while simultaneously 
willing that oneself not engage in the behavior. Based on this argument, helping behavior cannot 
be excluded from our broader obligations. On the topic of furthering the happiness of others, 
Kant similarly adds, "I should seek to further the happiness of others ... merely because the 
maxim which excludes it from my duty cannot be comprehended as a universal law in one and 
the same volition" (Kant, 1969, 68). 
In terms of these broader duties, Kant allows for greater flexibility in fulfilling them as 
compared to stricter duties. For example, while the principle of never breaking promises is a 
strict duty which must be adhered to at all times, the fulfillment of broader duties such as 
cultivating talents or helping people is not absolute in terms of the time and manner in which that 
requirement is applied. 
An understanding of Kant's first categorical imperative and his distinction between strict 
and broad duties can be employed to derive the social obligations of physicians. This section 
establishes the grounds of physicians' social obligations using Kant's first categorical imperative 
based upon three lines of reason: first, physicians have general social obligations as part of their 
duty to help others; second, physicians have social obligations as professionals; thirdly, 
physicians have specific social obligations as medical experts. 
First, physicians' social obligations are grounded in the Kantian responsibility to help 
others. Actions of physicians fulfilling social responsibilities fall in the same category as helping 
behavior, namely that of broad, meritorious duties to others. With helping behavior, it is clear 
that one cannot will the help of another and simultaneously will a world in which no one assisted 
anyone else. By the same logic, one also cannot will the non-contractual help of a physician and 
simultaneously will a world in which no physicians assisted anyone beyond their patients. But 
must physicians themselves will the non-contractual help of other physicians? 
This question can be answered in the second line of argument grounding physicians' 
social obligations, namely that physicians have social obligations based on their general status as 
professionals. With respect to other professions, one must concede that a physician requires the 
assistance of others outside the medical community with specialized knowledge. For example, a 
physician may draw upon the expertise of someone with specialized knowledge about a specific 
culture or an interpreter in dealing with an immigrant patient. A physician may also draw upon 
the expertise of a lawyer in public advocacy work. Although such situations are non-contractual, 
the fulfillment of general social obligations by other professionals is instrumental to the 
physician's own ability to best fulfill her role. As such, a physician cannot will the assistance of 
a professional and also will to live in a world in which professionals hold no social obligations, 
for this would be a contradiction in will. 
Finally, physicians have social obligations which are specific to their position as medical 
experts. These social obligations include, but are not limited to, emergency situations. It is 
reasonable that all individuals, both physicians and non-physicians, must will the assistance of a 
physician outside of the contractual physician-patient relationship in emergency situations. For 
example, one must will that an individual with medical knowledge be moved to help in 
emergencies such as a natural disaster like Hurricane Katrina or an attack like September 11th• In 
both situations, physicians provided immediate medical care to victims regardless of whether or 
not the individuals were their patients. Thus applying Kant's first version of the categorical 
imperative, one can assert that physicians do have a social duty to help in emergency situations. 
The question then becomes, do physicians have more specific social obligations outside of 
emergency situations as medical experts according to Kant? 
It seems reasonable that most individuals, including physicians, require the assistance of 
a physician with specialized medical knowledge in non-contractual, non-emergency situations at 
some point in their Jives. For example, in the United States where health care is a commodity, it 
is subject to the rise and fall of the market economy. In situations where the demand exceeds the 
supply and there is a subsequent shortage of health care, individuals without health insurance and 
without the ability to pay for health care at any point in their lives must will that physicians 
fulfill social obligations beyond their patients in order to receive the medical assistance they 
need. This becomes increasingly critical for communities of low socio-economic status with little 
resources and drastically limited access to health care professionals. Individuals living in such 
communities with inadequate access to health care cannot will a world in which physicians do 
not meet social obligations for such a world does not further autonomous reason. But how 
prevalent are these communities? 
USA Today reported 75 million individuals in the United States who went without health 
care coverage for a period of time in 2001 to 2002 (USA Today, 2003). More recent data shows 
that as much as 15.6% of the US population was uninsured in 2004, and perhaps surprisingly, 
8% of these uninsured hold at least the equivalent of a college degree (Census, 2005). 
Furthermore, an analysis of the uninsured by income also showed that 8% earn an annual income 
of $75,000 or higher (Census, 2005). Given these demographics, it is probable that a number of 
physicians have been or will be without health care coverage at some point in their lives, 
particularly before becoming physicians. Any physician who has been without health care 
coverage in the past must will that physicians treat indigent patients as part of their social 
obligations. 
One might argue that those individuals such as physicians with the economic means to 
pay for medical services do not need non-contractual, non-emergency help from other 
physicians, and thus could will a world in which physicians do not meet social obligations. First, 
this argument is not reasonable given that physicians still need the non-contractual, non-
emergency assistance of other professionals and thus must will to live in a world where all 
professionals meet these obligations. However, consider also how even those of high socio-
economic status benefit from fulfilled social obligations of physicians with regards to their own 
medical care. The quality of care that these patients receive is dependent in part on the voluntary 
medical knowledge-sharing that occurs between physicians, on public health research, on 
medical ethics decisions and on the education of future physicians. 
As medical care has become increasingly specialized, teams of physicians frequently care 
for the same patient and thus joint consultation is certainly necessary and beneficial. This 
contractual medical knowledge-sharing is instrumental to quality health care for the patient. Yet 
this kind of medical knowledge-sharing also takes place in non-contractual situations. For 
example, physicians often draw upon the medical knowledge and expertise of colleagues in 
treating their own patients. Take a pediatric cardiologist in New York faced with an especially 
unique health problem for one of his patients. In order to provide the best care for this patient, he 
may contact a colleague in North Carolina and request advice in the situation. We might consider 
it part of the New York physician's contractual obligation to seek out his colleague's advice in 
order to best improve the health of his patient. However, while he may have this contractual 
obligation, certainly there is no contractual obligation on the part of the North Carolina physician 
who is volunteering medical knowledge for an individual who is not her patient. In such cases of 
non-contractual medical knowledge-sharing, do physicians have a broad duty to share their 
medical knowledge? The North Carolina physician cannot will to ignore the requests of her New 
York colleague, and simultaneously will that she benefit from the voluntary sharing of medical 
knowledge by her other colleagues. Much as with the grounds for helping behavior, this 
contradiction in will is the basis for the grounds of the broad duty of the physician to share her 
medical knowledge when reasonably possible to do so. All individual patients, regardless of their 
socio-economic status, who are in contractual relationships with a physician directly benefit from 
this voluntary sharing of medical knowledge. Thus, even those of high socio-economic status 
including physicians must will that the dissemination of medical knowledge within the medical 
community fall under broader obligations of physicians. 
Additionally, those who can afford proper health care still benefit from widely publicized 
data on public health issues or other research which is achieved through the non-contractual, 
non-emergency help of physicians. The voluntary acquisition of data by physicians contributes to 
public health research which affects all of society. While leaders of many public health 
investigations may be fulfilling contractual duties (for example if they work for the government 
in a public health role), the collection of data for such research can often involve the voluntary 
assistance of physicians. For example, a physician might agree to collect quantitative data from 
his patients for use in a clinical study or other public health project. The voluntary actions of 
physicians who assist in data collection for projects such as preventative medical research or 
research on the containment of disease contribute to the preservation of a healthy society. As all 
individuals in a society, including physicians, benefit from the maintenance of a healthy 
community, physicians must will that all physicians fulfill social obligations such as those duties 
related to the furtherance of public health. 
Furthermore, with regards to medical ethics decisions, physicians frequently voluntarily 
serve on hospital administrative boards or ethics committees that determine quality of care and 
policy issues surrounding health. While they often do not receive monetary compensation for this 
service, physicians' participation and input into the details of health care provision is vital to 
improving medical services. Thus it is reasonable for patients of that hospital. including 
physicians who receive medical care from colleagues at the hospital, to will that their physicians 
volunteer on these committees as part of their social obligations. 
Furthermore, the training of physicians is dependent upon the transfer of medical 
knowledge from each previous generation of physicians. Current physicians benefited in the past 
from the voluntary mentoring of elder physicians-from concrete examples such as shadowing 
physicians, rounding in the hospital under the care of a physician, or completing a residency with 
a physician to less concrete examples of encouragement and consultation from elder physicians. 
As they benefited from the voluntary sharing of medical knowledge as students, current 
physicians must also engage in the social obligation of training the next generation of physicians. 
These arguments show that quality of health care is affected by many non-contractual 
actions of physicians. Examples of such actions include research on public health, service on 
hospital committees and the education of future physicians. For all these reasons, even those with 
the economic means to pay for medical care such as physicians themselves must will the non-
contractual, non-emergency help of physicians with specialized medical knowledge in order to 
optimize the level of health care available in their society. 
Given the Kantian broad duty to help others, it is clear from both the physician's role as a 
professional and a medical expert that physicians have the broad duty to engage in social 
obligations. Beyond providing emergency care, physicians must also will to engage in other 
social obligations such as medical consultation, training medical residents and serving on 
hospital committees in order to maintain the high quality of health care available to the 
community at large. Application of Kant's second version of the categorical imperative sheds 
further light on the grounds of the social obligations of physicians. 
The grounds of the social obligations of physicians according to 
Kant's second categorical imperative 
Kant's second version of the categorical imperative further elucidates the grounds of 
social obligations physicians hold: "Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person 
or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only" (Kant, 1969, 54). The negative 
duty of never treating humanity as 'means only' can be illustrated by the duty to tell the truth. 
For example, according to this second version of the categorical imperative, duty forbids lying 
because if one lies to another individual, one is treating that person as means to one's own end 
and not respecting their ability to reason. 
Beyond the negative duty to never treat humanity as means, the positive duty of always 
treating humanity as ends is also key to this second version of the categorical imperative. As 
Kant further explains: "For the ends of any person, who is an end in himself, must as far as · 
possible also be my end, if that conception of an end in itself is to have its full effect on me" 
(Kant, 1969, 55). To treat others as ends requires that one recognize the worth of others' own 
rational pursuits, and further contributes to their ends insofar as it is reasonably possible to do so. 
In a similar manner, for the physician to treat her patients as ends in themselves and not means, 
she must contribute to their ability to function autonomously. In other words, it is not enough for 
the physician to simply do no harm to the patient. Such actions, though fulfilling the negative 
duty of not treating humanity as means, would not fulfill the positive duty oftreating humanity 
as ends. As Kant further clarifies, "this harmony with humanity as an end in itself is only 
negative rather than positive if everyone does not also endeavor, so far as he can, to further the 
ends of others" (Kant, 1 %9, 55). In fulfilling the positive duty to treat humanity as ends, the 
physician must contribute to the rational agency of the patient. 
In applying this second categorical imperative -to the social obligations of physicians, it is 
evident that physicians' role in the preservation of health is instrumental towards the treatment of 
humanity as ends and the further advancement of the rationality of all patients. A baseline of 
health is necessary for individual liberty and the optimal functioning of any society. Health falls 
into the category of welfare interests as a minimal but non-ultimate goal. When health is 
damaged, a person's autonomy is seriously harmed because his aspirations and ability to reason 
are undermined by his physical state. As such, the keepers of health are critical towards the 
furtherance of mankind's rationality. Good health is a condition for exercising rationality, and 
thus the engagement of physicians in the promotion of health is essential to treating humanity as 
ends. While fulfilling social obligations for the sake of well-being or improving health as ends in 
themselves would not be particularly Kantian, there is a sense in which these values of well-
being and health are preconditions for exercising rationality. If health is essential for the function 
of rationality, it is reasonable that health must be preserved. 
But does application ofKanfs second version of the categorical imperative indicate that 
physicians have duties to advance health beyond their patients? In other words, can a physician 
fulfill her broad duties as a medical expert to further the projects of others solely through the 
relationship with her own patients? With Kant's emphasis on the collective nature of individuals 
as humanity with respect to meritorious duty, it seems apparent that the scope of these duties 
extends beyond the interactions with individuals to which one is contractually-obligated. 
In the physician-patient relationship, the physician is under a contractual obligation to 
advance the health of the patient to the best of her ability. Such health experienced by the patient 
can be viewed as a precondition for exercising rationality. Within this realm of her own patients, 
it may be possible for the physician to fulfill broad social obligations. For example, one could 
meet the requirements of the duty to help others by teaching an illiterate patient how to read. But 
is it possible, within this contractual relationship, for the physician to fulfill her broad duties to 
help others in the context of her medical knowledge or skills? In fact, because the relationship of 
a physician and patient is contractual in nature, any care provided to the patient in the medical 
context by the physician falls under the confines of strict, contractual duties. It follows that 
though it may be possible to fulfill broader helping duties to others in the context of one's 
patients, it is not possible to fulfill broader medical obligations. As a result, furthering humanity 
as an ends requires that the physician fulfill medical social obligations outside the context of her 
own contractual patients. According to this application of Kant's second version of the 
categorical imperative, physicians do have a duty to engage in the promotion of health at the 
social level. 
Also consider a more specific example in the application of Kant's second version of the 
categorical imperative. According to this version, do physicians have a duty to engage in non-
contractual medical knowledge-sharing as previously derived in this chapter from Kant's first 
version of the categorical imperative? From the categorical imperative of treating humanity as 
ends, one can derive the physician's duty to share her medical knowledge on two accounts. First, 
since not sharing medical knowledge would be free-riding on other physicians who do share their 
knowledge, such actions would not treat other physicians as ends in themselves and thus 
physicians must have a duty to share their medical knowledge when reasonably possible to do so. 
Secondly, not sharing one's medical knowledge could detract from the preservation of the 
rationality of a patient, and thereby in fulfilling the duty to treat humanity as ends, physicians 
must voluntarily share their medical knowledge with their colleagues in order to treat all patients 
as ends. 
More generally, one might argue that the best way to fulfill the Kantian ethic of treating 
humanity as ends by engaging in helping behavior is to do so with what one uniquely has to 
offer. Thus, the lawyer ought to help others, especially through his knowledge of the law; the 
pastor ought to help others, especially through her knowledge of the spiritual; and of course, the 
physician ought to help others, especially through her knowledge of medicine. 
Based on Kant's second categorical imperative, physicians do hold social obligations in 
the context of their role as medical experts, including the obligation to share medical knowledge. 
The fulfillment of these obligations positively furthers the autonomy of rational agents. 
An application of Kant's first and second versions of the categorical imperative indicates 
that physicians do have social obligations. But beyond the question of grounding. how does 
Kant's understanding of morality contribute to an assessment of the motivation behind fulfilling 
these social duties? The next section evaluates the moral worth of motivation behind such actions 
based upon Kant's ethical theory. 
Kant's assessment of motivation in the fulfillment of social obligations 
According to Kant, reason is supreme and the moral worth of an action is directly" 
dependent upon the sense of duty behind it Kant asserts that other motivations are of no moral 
worth: "To duty every other motive must give place, because duty is the condition of a will good 
in itself, whose worth transcends everything" (Kant, 1969, 23). For Kant, motivation based on 
inclination has no moral worth. In cases where actions line up with both inclination and duty, one 
might apply a test of moral worth by seeing whether or not one would still commit the same 
actions even if one was not inclined to do so. In other words, if a physician is inclined to educate 
the next generation of physicians because she enjoys doing so, the test of the moral worth of her 
action is not based on the consequence that she has fulfilled her duty. Rather, the test of moral 
worth is determined by whether or not she would still train incoming physicians even if she was 
not inclined to do so. If the answer is yes, then her action is appropriately morally worthy; if no, 
her action is based on an inclination and is therefore of no moral worth. 
Furthermore, Kant makes the distinction between hypothetical and categorical 
imperatives. It is not enough for the imperative to be hypothetical-in other words, for 
motivations such as the glory of God, self-interest, the good of others, etc., to be ends for the 
sake of which one might do the moral thing. Rather, the imperative on which one acts must be 
categorical-that is, if the action is to have moral worth, morality must be considered an end in 
itself. For example, Kant states, ''the categorical imperative alone can be taken as a practical law, 
while all the others may be called principles of the will but not laws" (Kant, 1969, 43). Principles 
of the will are transient; what is moral cannot be determined by the results actions produce. 
Clearly, Kant is not a consequentialist, for he states "What is essentially good in it [the 
categorical imperative] consists in the intention, the result being what it may" (Kant, 1969, 38). 
Here intention means the motivation behind the act, and good intention refers to motivations of 
duty based on reason. Thus the morality of an action is not dependent upon the consequences 
that action produces but rather the nature of the intention behind the action. According to Kant, 
the categorical imperative as "the unconditional command leaves the will no freedom to choose 
the opposite" (Kant, 1969, 43). Using reason, one can only come up with the morally right 
answer in the application of a categorical imperative. 
Kant also speaks of the dangers of heteronomous influences on the autonomous reason. 
For example, he defines heteronomy as "every case in which an object of the will must be 
assumed as prescribing the rule which is to determine the will" (Kant, 1969, 71). Under such 
heteronomous influences, the autonomy of reason is bypassed because an outward object of the 
will prescribes the rule rather than the will itself, as in the example of action done because it is 
the will of God. According to this rule, physicians who fulfill social obligations for religious 
reasons are not performing acts of moral worth. Furthermore, Kant states that the will in 
heteronomous cases "never determines itself directly by the conception of the action itself but 
only by the inventive which the foreseen result of the action incites in the will-that is, 'I ought 
to do something because I will something else"' (Kant, 1969, 71). Accordingly, heteronomous 
influences also include consequential motivations such as physicians fulfilling social obligations 
from the sole motive that their actions elevate the health of the community. 
In evaluating the motivations of physicians fulfilling social obligations according to the 
Kantian ethic, one might first ask, did the physicians do what duty required of them? Assume 
physicians did meet their social obligations, perhaps by volunteering in a free clinic, lobbying 
politicians or engaging in clinical research. What would Kant say ought to motivate these 
physicians as they meet these meritorious duties? The Kantian question then becomes, why did 
they do it? And more specifically, did they do it from duty (as opposed to self-interest, 
compassion, or religion, for example, in which cases their actions might still be in accordance 
with duty)? From Kant's perspective, it is clear that physicians ought only to be motivated to 
fulfill their obligations out of a sense of duty in order to perform acts of moral worth. 
A critique of Kant's ethical theory 
While Kant's ethical framework provides a compelling justification for the grounds of the 
social duties that physicians hold, his absolutist position on the nature of the motivation behind 
acts of moral worth disregards many morally worthy motivations in physicians' fulfillment of 
social obligations. For example, according to Kant, none of the following actions have moral 
worth: a physician provides care to the indigent because doing she enjoys doing so; a physician 
provides care to the indigent because she wants to elevate the health of her community; a 
physician provides care to the indigent because she has compassion for others; a physician 
provides care to the indigent because she feels it is God's will that she do so. Is it problematic to 
discount the moral worth of the above actions simply because they are not solely motivated by 
the autonomous reason's determination of duty? 
The above examples pinpoint actions committed from a wide variety of motivations 
which are self-interested, compassionate, or religious in nature. Physicians are also motivated by 
duty, but in a more expansive sense than the Kantian definition of duty. Contemporary ideas of 
"duty" are based upon much broader influences than the Kantian-based duties determined 
through application of the categorical imperative. Physicians, like everyone else, might talk 
about performing actions out of a sense of duty. However, though some may mean duty in the 
same way that Kant does, others may conceive of duty in a different manner. For example, when 
a physician says she is motivated out of a sense of duty or obligation, she might mean she has a 
duty to fulfill social obligations as defined by tradition, religion, or social forces including the 
law, all of which Kant would discount as heteronomous. In contrast, Kant defines actions done 
from duty in the specialized sense. Compared to Kant's specialized conception of duty, these 
other, so-called duty-based motivations are heteronomous and thus can hold no moral worth in 
Kant's framework. 
Consider the extent of agreement with statements of motivation regarding duty by 
medical professionals surveyed at Crossover Ministry. Respondents were tested to see if they 
rated the four motivations of duty, self-interest, compassion, and religious motivation differently. 
An analysis of the data showed that they did rate these motivations differently, and further tests 
defined these differences. As it turns out, respondents were significantly more likely to identify 
compassion, not duty, as their primary motivation. Furthermore, there was no significant 
difference between duty, self-interest and religious motivation. Therefore, in this particular 
sample of physician volunteers, Kantian duty is not a significant motivator to fulfill social 
obligations. Within-subjects tests further identified a significant negative relationship between 
duty and religious motivation. This negative correlation indicates that the more individuals are 
religiously motivated, the less likely they are to be motivated out of Kantian duty. Furthermore, 
this data also indicates that some other so-called duty-based motivations such as religion are no 
more significantly motivating that the Kantian conception of duty. Finally, a within-subjects 
analysis of data indicated no significant difference between duty and self-interest. In other 
words, people were no more or less likely to identify duty as a motivator than self-interest. 
Kant's view allows for three types of actions in the assessment of morality: those which 
are required, those which are merely permissible, and those which are forbidden (Table 1). 
Clearly, forbidden actions have no moral worth as they contradict duty, and merely permissible 
actions cannot be morally worthy because they fail to fulfill duty. One can further distinguish 
motivations behind forbidden actions as having negative moral worth, whereas motivations 
behind merely permissible actions simply have no moral worth. However, when it comes to the 
motivation behind required actions, Kant asserts that those actions done in accordance with duty 
also have no moral worth; only those required actions performed from duty have moral worth. 
Action Motivation Morality 
Required From duty Moral worth 
In accordance with duty No moral worth 
Merely Permissible n/a No moral worth 
Forbidden n/a Negative moral worth 
I Table 1: Applying Kant's theo1'J=Action, Motivation and Morality. 
There are three reasons why Kant's determination of morality is inadequate with respect 
to the morality of required actions done in accordance with duty. First of all, just because some 
motivations may not be as good as the motivation based on Kantian duty, it does not follow from 
this that these other motivations have no moral worth. Second, within required actions 
committed in accordance with duty, there are some motivations which are clearly morally better 
than others. Third, many motivations that inspire actions in accordance with duty are clearly 
better in their quality of moral worth than motivations that inspire merely permissible actions. In 
this case, required actions done in accordance with duty should have a different moral worth 
when compared to merely permissible actions. 
First of all, Kant objects to all motivations other than Kantian-duty when distinguishing 
actions of moral worth. For example, his account implies that the physician providing indigent 
care out of a sense of duty even though he is not inclined to do so is completing an act of great 
moral worth. In contrast, the physician providing indigent care out of compassion is fulfilling a 
duty but nonetheless, completing an act of no moral worth. Perhaps the former physician's 
fulfillment of his social obligations may be considered more admirable since he is doing the right 
thing even though he is not inclined to do so. However, comparatively it does not seem that the 
other physician's similar actions are entirely void of moral worth simply because his inclination 
is aligned with the required action. It would not follow that because the one physician is 
fulfilling obligations out of duty and thereby completing acts of moral worth, the other physician 
fulfilling obligations out of another motivation such as compassion cannot be completing acts of 
moral worth. 
Undoubtedly, some motivations can undermine the morality of an act, and thus it could 
be problematic to claim that any motivation leading to the completion of a required action is of 
moral worth. However, while Kantian duty might be the best motivation, it does not follow from 
this that all required actions outside of those done from duty have no moral worth. 
Secondly, within the category ofrequired actions done in accordance with duty, it is clear 
that some motivations are definitively different from bad motivations such as the distinction 
between caring for the indigent out of compassion as compared to caring for the indigent to pad a 
resume. Take another example of providing charity care in order to make colleagues feel guilty 
or to get in the good graces of a political representative. These motivations might undermine the 
moral worth of the act of providing care to the indigent. Moral theory ought to reflect the fact 
that motivations such as compassion for the uninsured or concern for the elevation of health are 
morally different from these clearly bad motivations. 
Thirdly, Kant's determination of the morality of required actions done in accordance with 
duty does not make a clear distinction between the moral worth of these actions as compared to 
the moral worth of actions that are merely permissible. Based on a considered view of morality, 
most of us would be uncomfortable placing actions committed out of compassion in the same 
moral category as actions committed without relevance to duty. For example, it seems 
incongruous to evaluate the charity care of a physician based on compassion as morally equal (in 
its quality of having no moral worth) to another physician's participation in an exercise class at 
the gym. Actions done in accordance with duty (in Kantian terms, actions committed from 
inclination based on a heteronomous influence) appear to be of greater moral worth than other 
merely permissible actions because the motivations behind these actions inspire the fulfillment of 
duty. 
It seems insufficiently discriminating to evaluate motivations behind the fulfillment of 
duty in the same way we evaluate motivations behind merely permissible actions, and for good 
reason. If we are concerned about social obligations such as the duties physicians hold to society, 
we ought also to care about the fulfillment of these obligations. One cannot care about the 
fulfillment of duties without considering the multifarious motivations that lead to their 
fulfillment, and certainly the morality of motivations behind such required actions merit greater 
consideration than of those behind merely permissible actions for the former lead to the 
fulfillment of duty. 
Clearly, motivations outside of Kantian duty, although perhaps not as good, can still have 
moral worth. Furthermore, there are some motivations behind required actions that are better 
than others. Finally, motivations inspiring required actions done in accordance with duty should 
be considered separately from motivations inspiring merely permissible actions in the 
determination of moral worth. From these arguments it follows that many required actions done 
in accordance with duty are performed from motivations that do have moral worth. 
The Kantian ethic convincingly depicts the grounds of the social obligations of 
physicians. While Kant's strict determination of morality based on motivation is limited, this 
chapter finds that some required actions performed in accordance with duty do have moral 
worth. 
How might this understanding of morally worthy motivations according to Kant be 
helpful in promoting the fulfillment of social obligations by physicians? Specifically. the model 
of motivation presented in this chapter would assign moral worth to the actions of some 
physicians who provide charity care in free clinics out of motivations other than duty. In 
promoting the non-contractual interactions of physicians, these interactions should be seen as 
duties and many of the motivations behind these actions ought to be viewed as morally worthy. 
The rest of this thesis explores the moral worth of these other motivations. The next three 
chapters tum to specific arguments about self-interest, compassion and religious motivation to 
see if physicians should be motivated in these ways. 
Chapter three: Motivated to fulfill social obligations out of self-interest 
Self-interest can refer to many motivations, but perhaps the most common motivation 
that comes to mind in this category is that of monetary compensation. In fact,, in a free market 
economy, the prediction of consumer preferences by neoclassical economic theory rests on the 
dominant assumption that consumer actions within the market are guided by self-interest. 
Physicians are part of this free market economy and potentially motivated out of self-interest 
when their actions are monetarily compensated, such as in the case of the provision of care to 
patients. Furthermore, monetary compensation is also, though infrequently, employed to 
motivate physicians to use their medical skills beyond their patients. 
Regardless of whether or not physicians are receiving monetary compensation for the use 
of their skills beyond their patients, the quality of health care we receive is partly dependent 
upon the actions of physicians beyond the physician-patient relationship. In a nation where 
medicine is not sheltered from the rise and fall of the market, the importance of physicians 
meeting social obligations even in the absence of monetary compensation is readily apparent. 
Given the essential contribution of physicians volunteering their services, the aim of this thesis is 
to address ways to motivate physicians to continue to engage in social obligations that are not 
compensated monetarily. While the definition of social obligations in this thesis precludes those 
actions performed for monetary compensation, physicians engaged in the fulfillment of social 
obligations may still be motivated out of other kinds of self-interest. 
This chapter specifically addresses the question: are there self-interested motivations 
which are both justified and morally relevant to the fulfillment of social obligations? Section one 
of this chapter establishes the grounds of the social obligations of physicians according to Plato's 
discussion of leadership in the Republic. Section two explores Plato's concept of moral 
motivation and the role of self-interest in ethical behavior. Section three outlines the difference 
between selfish and self-interested motivations, and concludes that self-interested actions can 
have moral worth. 
Plato's grounds for the social obligations of physicians 
In a discussion of rulership in Plato's Republic, Socrates questions Thrasymachus' claim 
that what is right is the advantage of the stronger party. Socrates analyzes Thrasymachus' 
argument by framing the discussion of rulership in terms of the nature of crafts. He first 
emphasizes that crafts have a purpose which is not to their own advantage. After assuming that 
rulership is a craft, he concludes that the purpose of rulership is not to seek its own advantage but 
rather to look after the well-being of those being served. In his discussion of the purpose of 
crafts, Socrates uses the example of the craft of medicine, asking Thrasymachus about the 
purpose of the physician. IfThrasymachus' claim is to be supported, what is right ought to be to 
the advantage of the physician. Trying to refute Thrasymachus' claim, Socrates asks him "the 
one who's a doctor in the strict sense of the term. Is he a businessman or someone who attends 
to sick people? Think about the genuine doctor'' (Plato, 1993, 341 c ). 
By setting up this dichotomy, Socrates is not implying that the genuine doctor does not 
earn any money in a business sense. Rather, Socrates is asking Thrasymachus to think about 
what it means to be a physician. In essence, by referring to the genuine doctor, Socrates is 
ultimately asking Thrasymachus to make a claim about the overarching purpose of the profession 
of medicine and, the purpose of the professional, i.e., the physician. When considering the two 
options Socrates gives--either that the doctor is a businessman or someone who attends to the 
sick-it is evident that only the former will support Thrasymachus' prior claim. For 
Thrasymachus to support his argument that what is right is to the advantage of the stronger, the 
medical profession would have to be defined in such a way that its purpose is to engage in what 
is to its own advantage. However, Thrasymachus responds to Socrates' question with support for 
the latter definition, as he states that the doctor is the one who "attends to sick people" (Plato, 
1993, 341 c ). While the doctor does receive money for his services, his purpose as a member of 
the medical profession is to treat the sick. Socrates' illumination of the altruistic purpose of the 
physician and Thrasymachus' agreement with this position refute Thrasymachus' prior claim of 
what is right. What is right is not the behavior recommended by Thrasymachus' conception of 
the advantage of the stronger. In the case of the physician, what is right is the furtherance of the 
purpose of the medical profession, which is actually the advantage of the weaker or the sick. 
In his book on Corporate Integrity: Rethinking Organizational Ethics and Leadership, 
Marvin T. Brown's distinction between purpose and motive in the "for-profit" sector sheds more 
light: 
In The American Heritage Dictionary, "for-profit" is defined as: "Established or operated 
with the intention of making a profit: a for-profit hospital." Key to this definition is the 
notion of intention. To say that individuals intend to establish or operate a hospital for 
profit, however, is not the same as to say that the hospital, as an organization, intends to 
make a profit. If a human person has intentions, it usually means that the person is 
motivated to do something. Behind the motivation are desires, which originate from our 
situated embodied existence. Organizations are not situated in a similar way. They are not 
part of the animal kingdom. They cannot be motivated by profit, because they do not 
have motives. Profit may motivate an individual to start a company or to work for one; it 
cannot ''motivate" a corporation. (2005, 111) 
Just as organizations do not have motives, one could argue that professions do not have motives 
either. Rather, it is the people in the profession who have the motives. Motivations are extrinsic 
to the craft or profession of medicine, because the profession of medicine is concerned with more 
than individual doctors. The ends of medicine are not individual ends. but social ends. The 
identity of a physician derives from his acceptance of the ends of medicine as his own ends in his 
practice of the craft. 
While Socrates and Thrasymachus conclude that the true doctor is not simply a 
businessman, we might wonder if monetary compensation is nonetheless linked to our notion of 
what it means to be a physician. However, an appeal to common sense would tell us that the 
person who provides only charity medical care is just as much of a physician as the one who sees 
patients for monetary compensation in a private practice. 
A further distinction arises from Plato's Republic with respect to the purpose of a craft. It 
follows from Socrates' arguments that seeking the ends or purposes of a craft is not the same as 
seeking the preservation of that craft itself. For example, Socrates draws a parallel argument to 
the purpose of the physician when he further explains, "medicine does not consider the welfare 
of medicine, but the welfare of the body" (Plato, 1993, 342c). Similarly, the purpose of a 
physician in his practice of medicine is to seek the physical welfare of others and not his own 
welfare. For example, in Plato's Republic, Socrates explicitly states, "Surely, then, no doctor, in 
his capacity as a doctor, considers or enjoins what is advantageous to the doctor, but what is 
advantageous to the patient?" (Plato, 1993, 342d). In a parallel fashion, the purpose of medicine 
is to consider the welfare of its constituents, not to consider its own welfare. In other words, a 
physician 1s practice of medicine ought not to be intrinsically focused on the preservation of 
medicine itself any more than it ought to be intrinsically focused on his own welfare. Rather, the 
physician's practice of medicine ought to be intrinsically focused on the well-being of the body. 
For example, the discovery of a mistake in medical treatment ought not to be brushed under the 
rug in order to preserve the respectability of the physician or the medical profession. Instead, 
medical mistakes must be addressed in light of the ends of the profession, namely, what is best 
for the well-being of those being served. 
For the purposes of our discussion, the grounding of the social obligations of physicians 
according to Plato rests in this necessity to fulfill the ends of the medical profession which he 
defines as treating the sick. If medicine ought not to seek its own preservation first and foremost 
but rather the well-being of the body, then physicians in their role as doctors ought to be 
primarily concerned with these ends of the profession. 
But what, specifically, does it mean for the physician to be concerned with what is 
advantageous to the body? To whose body, and to what extent, and to how many bodies? This 
thesis supports the idea that the purposes of medicine at minimum extend beyond the physician-
patient relationship. In the context of this thesis, the question of ''whose body" extends beyond 
the physician's patient's body. The question of ''to what extent" goes beyond supporting what is 
directly medically advantageous to a physical body to include promoting health through indirect 
medical activities such as public health research, training and even ethics. And again, "to how 
many bodies" goes beyond just those bodies a physician treats to include those individuals at 
minimum in the local area and even extending the sphere to a national or global level. One could 
talk about the scope of a physician's responsibilities as including the promotion of the health of 
the "social body." In effect, this thesis holds that the physician ought to be concerned with what 
is advantageous to this "social body." However, would Plato have supported this broad 
understanding of social obligations for physicians as defined in this thesis? An understanding of 
medicine in ancient Greece may provide more insight into Plato's argument. 
In The Hippocratic Oath and the Ethics of Medicine, Steven Miles discusses a variety of 
roles the Greek physician would have performed beyond that of caring for individual patients. 
These roles included working with armies, traveling on diplomatic missions, treating the sick 
during epidemics, responding to civic health disasters and serving in appointments as "city 
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physicians" (Miles, 2004, 56). Miles further writes that physicians of the time understood "that 
the physician-citizenship role promoted the health of the citizens of a city-state, just as clinical 
work promoted the health of individuals" (Miles, 2004, 56). Considering the traditional 
occupations of physicians in the ancient Greece of Plato's day, it seems plausible that he may 
have considered many of these services as falling under the ends of medicine and thereby 
contributing to what is advantageous to the body. Furthermore, the Republic argues that what 
would best contribute to society determines the individual's role in society. Physicians engaging 
in these services outside of the physician-patient relationship are optimally contributing to 
society. 
Thus, we can conclude that physicians ought to be concerned with promoting the health 
of their community at large. When Plato's concept of what is advantageous to the body is 
understood in this context, those actions of physicians defined as the fulfillment of social 
obligations certainly meet the ends of the craft. In this way, the social obligations of physicians 
are grounded in their fulfillment of the purpose of medicine as defined by Plato which is to 
provide what is advantageous to the social body. 
Plato 's assessment of motivation in the fulfillment of social obligations 
At first consideration, it may appear that self-interested motivations are antithetical to the 
ends of the craft of medicine, and thus are not moral and should not be encouraged. After all, in 
fulfilling the altruistic purpose of medicine by treating the sick, there does not appear to be much 
room for self-interest. 
Ultimately, the physician's actions should be infonned and motivated by the ends of her 
profession which, according to Plato, are the provision of that which is physically beneficial. The 
care for the human body which a physician is to provide thus may not be instrumental towards 
goals other than this end, but rather must be intrinsic to the work of a physician. The focused 
ends of the craft of medicine which Plato defines are outward-looking, requiring that the 
physician see beyond himself to the proper care of another. This dogged focus on the physical 
well-being of the body may cause us to wonder, is there space for morally grounded self-
interested motivations in this framework? To answer this question, we must first take a look at 
Plato's view of self-interest. 
In his discussion on leadership, Socrates further elucidates that people who ask to be paid 
to serve in positions of authority do so, "because anyone who works properly with his expertise 
consistently fails to work for his own welfare ... when he gives instructions as a profession. It 
isn't his welfare, but that of his subject, which is his concern" (Plato, 1993, 347a). Because the 
ruler's concern is the welfare of his subjects, the leader must satisfy his concern for his own 
welfare outside his role as ruler. Similarly, because the physician's concern is the welfare of 
those she is serving, the physician may seek her own welfare only outside her role as a physician. 
In other words, though an individual may be morally free to pursue her own projects in other 
dimensions of life, specifically in her pursuit of a craft she is not morally allowed to do so. The 
physician can pursue his own projects which may not be aligned with the ends of medicine in 
cases when he is not acting in his role as a medical expert. 
Socrates' argument explains "why it is necessary to pay people with money or prestige 
before they are prepared to hold authority, or to punish them if they refuse" (Plato, 1993, 347a). 
While leaders can be persuaded to rule via money, honor, or punishment upon refusal, Plato 
further argues that in a city of just men no person would be willing to rule for money or honor. 
According to Plato, neither money nor prestige is a moral motivation, for both are despised by 
the best kinds of people. In other words, motivations based on money or honor are not just self-
interested but selfish, and therefore immoral. Rather, the just man is persuaded to rule in 
conditions where the consequences of not ruling are to be ruled by an unjust leader. Socrates 
states, "The ultimate punishment for being unwilling to assume authority oneself is to be 
governed by a worse person, and it is fear of this happening ... which prompts good men to 
assume power occasionally" (Plato, 1993, 347d). The motivation of the good man who will rule 
in order to avoid being ruled by an unjust leader is straightforward. He will rule because it is in 
his own self-interest to do so. Still, it is not selfish for him to act in this way because he is not 
motivated by the prospects of money or honor. 
As Socrates continues, ''were a community of good men to exist, ... it would be glaringly 
obvious that any genuine ruler really is incapable of considering his own welfare, rather than that 
of his subject, and the consequence would be that anyone with any sense would prefer receiving 
benefit to all the problems that go with conferring it" (Plato, 1993, 347d). Though not motivated 
by money or honor, it turns out that the individuals who make up Plato's city of good men are 
motivated by some form of self-interest. If a good man chooses to accept a position of rulership 
to prevent being ruled by an unjust person, he may be sacrificing the pursuit of some of his own 
projects in leading. However, by avoiding being ruled by an unjust leader, he would still be 
acting in part in his own self-interest. 
But does the position of the ruler adequately serve as an analogy for the moral worth of 
the motivations of the physician to adopt the ends of her profession? In the case of Socrates' 
discussion of rulership, the two key aspects of motivation and action with respect to the leader 
should be considered in drawing an analogy between the ruler and the physician. With respect to 
motivation, the leader's actions are still partly self-interested because the pursuit of his own 
projects would be diminished ifhe were under an unjust ruler and his own pursuit of justice in 
ruling constitutes happiness. With respect to action, the leader sacrifices some of his own 
interests in his role as ruler. Consider, first, whether a parallel can be drawn between the leader's 
self-interested motivations in ruling and the physician's motivations to pursue the ends of her 
craft. 
According to Plato, the good man who chooses to rule is acting out of self-interest in two 
ways. Firstly, though the leader's self-interest is not met through the direct pursuit of his own 
personal goals in the context of his role as leader, a person's ability to pursue these goals is 
directly affected by leadership. Thus, in cases where the alternative to being ruled by an unjust 
person (which may consequently halt the pursuit of one's own goals) is ruling oneself, it is in 
one's self-interest to assume leadership. Secondly,just actions constitute happiness and it is in 
one's best interest to be happy. Thus, in contributing to justice, the good man's exercise of 
leadership will also constitute happiness for himself. But does the role of self-interest in the 
actions of the ruler serve as an appropriate analogy for the motivations of the physician? 
On the first account, it is in the self-interest of the good man to rule when he finds 
himself in less-than-ideal circumstances. In essence, under non-ideal circumstances there appears 
to be a second best in terms of self-interest for the ruler. But does this notion of a second best for 
self-interest translate to the analogy of a physician? If the good man does not rule, the 
consequences for him are to be ruled by an unjust leader. However, if the physician does not 
pursue the ends of medicine, what are the costs to her ability to pursue her own self-interest? It 
appears that the concrete, negative consequences to the physician of not engaging in these social 
obligations are not daunting enough to motivate a physician to volunteer her services out of self-
interest. 
However tenuous the analogy of the ruler and the physician on this first account, an 
appeal to the second account of why the good man accepting leadership is acting out of self-
interest does apply in the case of the physician. The ruler is benefiting from just rulership which 
seeks the welfare of society, but he is also benefiting because his just action to rule amounts to 
his happiness. While the physician may not be directly benefiting from her efforts to fulfill social 
obligations, she is benefiting indirectly because her just actions constitute happiness. By this 
account, the analogy between the good man who chooses to rule and the physician holds true 
because the physician fulfilling social obligations is acting justly and therefore acting in his own 
interests by furthering what constitutes his happiness. 
With respect to the actions of the leader, it also seems reasonable to appeal to an analogy 
between the leader and the physician because one can draw a parallel between the sacrifice of the 
leader and the sacrifice of the physician. Based on Plato's view of the motivation of good men, 
there is a sense in which the good man willingly sacrifices some of his own interests in a position 
of leadership in order that the ends of leadership might be achieved. In accepting a position of 
rulership, the good man necessarily accepts the just ends of the profession and is thereby 
motivated to act. In a similar way, there is a sense in which the genuine doctor must willingly 
sacrifice some of his own interests in his role as a medical provider in order that the ends of 
medicine might be achieved. In training to become a physician, the good man necessarily 
pledges to pursue the purpose of medicine and ought to be thereby motivated to act. 
But to what extent must the good man sacrifice his own interests in order to fulfill the 
purpose of leadership? To what extent must the physician sacrifice her own interests in order to 
further the ends of medicine? The extent of sacrifice required to achieve the purposes of 
medicine depends upon the circumstances. Just as with the leader in Plato's city of good men, 
ideal circumstances would allow individuals to ethically pursue their own interests. But ideal 
circumstances would be situations in which all individuals had the ability to pursue their own 
interests-in Plato's ideal city, all good men could pursue their own interests because the leader 
would seek their. welfare. But much as Plato's city of good men is theoretical, in essence a sort of 
utopia, these circumstances rarely exist Consequently, the good man must rule or else an unjust 
ruler gain power. There is a loss to the good man who serves as leader, but it is not an all-things-
considered loss. This life is not as good as it might have been in ideal circumstances-it would 
be better ifhe did not have to sacrifice his own interests in order to lead. However, given the 
circumstances in which he finds himself, the good man is duty-bound to rule in his pursuit of 
what is just. Similarly, greater sacrifice is required of physicians in fulfilling the ends of 
medicine when ideal health care circumstances do not exist. In other words, when the health care 
system is plagued by exorbitant costs, poor access, or low-quality treatment, physicians are duty-
bound to sacrifice their own interests in the context of the profession to provide the best health 
care to their communities. 
Particularly with respect to medicine in a capitalistic society, the utopian ideal where all 
can pursue their self-interest is not a reality. If all physicians pursued their own interests in their 
practice of medicine, even more people would fall through the cracks of the current health care 
system, and the overall quality of health care provision would be worse for it. In order to make 
the pursuit of projects available to all, the genuine physician must be willing to sacrifice some of 
his own interests in order to contribute to a situation in which this baseline of health is possible. 
Though it may represent a loss to the physician to sacrifice his own projects for the sake of 
bettering the health of his community, ultimately his just actions constitute happiness and 
therefore it is not an all-things-considered loss to him. 
Thus, Plato's analysis of moral reasons to take on leadership is a compelling one in an 
application of moral reasons for physicians to engage in social obligations. Physicians must 
sacrifice their own interests in pursuit of the purpose of medicine in order for the optimal 
treatment of the sick to be reached. Plato's assessment of motivation does not exclude self-
interested motivations as immoral. Instead, Plato's characterization allows self-interest to be 
considered a moral motivation in the appropriate context. 
The morality of self-interested motivations 
Before further exploring the moral worth of the motivation of self-interest, additional 
clarification of the relationship between self-interested motivations and selfish motivations is 
warranted. As Paul Heyne states in his response to the most common moral objection to market 
systems, '"Self-interested behavior is selfish behavior only if one's interests are selfish" (Heyne, 
1995, 3). In other words, though all selfish behavior is self-interested, all self-interested behavior 
is not necessarily selfish. For example, if a physician collects data for a clinical research study on 
breast cancer patients only because he is monetarily compensated for his actions, his behavior is 
both selfish and in his own interest (i.e. self-interested). However, if a physician collects data for 
the same clinical research study because he hopes to contribute towards a cure for his mother 
who is also a breast cancer patient, his actions are self-interested in that he is pursuing his own 
desire for his mother to be healthy, but his actions are not necessarily selfish. In other words, in 
cases where one's own interests are other-regarding, one's actions are self-interested but not 
necessarily selfish. 
A detailed reflection of motivation reveals that some self-interested motivations are, in 
fact, moral and thereby worthy of encouragement. \Vhile it may seem ethically dubious to 
engage in actions for the self-interested and selfish reasons of monetary compensation or the 
padding of a resume, there may be other self-interested motivations which do not conflict with 
morality, and even others which rest on solid moral ground. Consider a few other scenarios 
where the morality of a self-interested motivation may not be as clearly wrong. Perhaps a 
physician trains medical residents because it makes bim feel needed, or increases his self-esteem. 
Another physician may volunteer on a hospital committee because it helps her to escape her own 
troubles. Yet another physician provides charity care for social reasons such as the approval of 
family or the opportunity to sustain friendships. Consider also the physician who collects data for 
a public health project in order to increase her own understanding of the subject, or to gain a new 
perspective about a problem in her community. And what about the physician who volunteers 
because engaging in social obligations is part of her identity as a physician? Many of these self-
interested motivations do not produce the same degree of moral opposition as do other selfish 
motivations relating to wealth or status in society. Though these kinds of selfish motivations may 
be permissible, they are not of moral worth. In fulfilling social obligations out of self-interested 
(but not selfish) motivations, these physicians are also contributing to their own happiness by 
doing what is just. 
In Understanding and assessing the motivations of volunteers: A functional approach, 
Clary and co-workers identify five types of self-interested motivation which are helpful in 
categorizing the examples above (1998, 1516-1530). These motivations fall into the groupings of 
protective, career, social, understanding and enhancement. Protective motivations include the 
desire to feel less lonely, to escape or work through problems and to relieve guilt. For example, a 
physician engaging in social obligations out of protective motivations might say that she 
volunteers because no matter how badly she feels, volunteering helps her to forget about it. 
Career motivations include opportunities to make business contacts, to explore career paths and 
to succeed professionally. For example, a physician seeking to maintain his or her skills while 
taking time off to raise a family might be motivated to volunteer at a free clinic. Social 
motivations include the approval ofloved ones and the maintenance and establishment of 
friendships. A physician might provide charity care because his or her spouse thinks favorably of 
those actions. Understanding motivations include hands-on experience, the exploration of 
strengths and the broadening of perspective. For example, a physician might agree to voluntarily 
collect data from her patients for a clinical health study in an effort to hone her understanding of 
the outcomes of treatment for a particular disease. Finally, enhancement motivations include 
enhancing self-esteem and feeling important or needed. As an illustration, a physician may 
provide emergency care because it makes her feel better about herself. While these categories are 
helpful for a descriptive understanding of self-interested motivations, this chapter's primary 
concern is with the normative question. Of these different self-interested motivations, which ones 
have moral worth? 
Again, the distinction between selfish motivations and self-interested motivations is 
helpful. For example, if a physician is engaging in social obligations for understanding or career 
motivations, we might further ask why is he thus motivated? He may seek to increase his 
understanding of medicine by providing charity care only so that he can earn more money as a 
physician. On the other hand, he may seek to broaden his perspective of medicine by engaging in 
public health research so that he may be more qualified to lobby government on behalf of health. 
care access for the poor. Again, the self-interested motivation is only selfish if one's interests are 
selfish. Thus an analysis of motivation must take care to get to the root of the motivation behind 
committing a particular action. 
Consider the survey results of volunteer medical professionals at Crossover Ministry. 
Out of twenty-one statements of motivation to which volunteers expressed extent of agreement, 
six statements were designed to measure self-interested motivation (Table 2). 
"I volunteer my medical services ... 
... because it's my role as a physician." 
Self-interested ... because I enjoy doing it." 
... because it makes me a better doctor." 
... because my profession looks highly upon volunteering." 
Selfish ... because people close to me approve of my volunteering." 
... because of the friendships." 
Table 2: Self-Interested Motivation Statement.Iii. 
Interestingly, initial tests indicated that self-interest and compassion were positively 
correlated. In other words, individuals who were likely to rate.compassion as a high motivation 
were also likely to rate self-interest as a high motivation. At first glance, this result is puzzling, 
for one would not expect for an individual highly motivated out of compassion to also be highly 
motivated out of self-interest-in fact, to some degree, the two appear to be mutually exclusive. 
However, additional analysis of the self-interested statements within the survey sheds further 
light. A similar analysis of the correlation between compassion and the first three statements of 
self-interest listed above (Table 2) reveals a correlation between self-interest and compassion in 
the positive direction. This finding reinforces the results of the same test wit~ all six self-
interested statements included, though the results pertaining to only the first three statements 
were not statistically significant. In comparison, an analysis of the last three statements of self-
interest listed above which are selfish (Table 2) and compassion is most striking. In this case, 
there was no significant relationship between self-interest and compassion. But what about these 
two groupings of self-interested statements accounts for these results? 
Recall Plato's claim that good men will not rule for money or honor, motivations which 
are "selfish." On the other hand, pursuing an action aligned with justice does constitute 
happiness for Plato, and in this sense such actions are motivated out of self-interest and are not 
designated "selfish." The last three self-interested statements appear to align with the idea of 
honor more closely than the first three, and thereby may be distinguished as "selfish" (Table 2). 
Comparatively, the first three self-interested statements on the survey appear to fall in the 
category of self-interest, indicating that an individual volunteers his services because his 
happiness is increased in so doing (Table 2). A physician who volunteers because she enjoys 
doing so is morally self-interested according to Plato's distinctions. However, how are the 
remaining two statements of self-interest ("because it's my role as a physician;" "because it's my 
role as a doctor") categorized? Further clarification of the kind of doctor a physician is striving to 
be would shed light on these two statements. Given the positive relationship between physicians 
assigning a high rating to compassion and these two self-interested statements, it may be that 
these medical professionals are motivated to become physicians with valuable medical skills in 
order to give to their communities. In this way, the pursuit of their own goals involves 
motivations which are other-regarding. 
Compare morality according to Immanu~l Kant to Plato's view of morality. The morality 
of a physician's actions according to Kant depends upon the motivation to perform them based 
on duty alone. Alternatively, Plato's assessment of morality is dependent upon the action's 
advancement of justice, which more specifically in the context of medicine indicates the action• s 
contribution towards the ends of the medical profession (Table 3). 
Action Motivation Morality 
Self-interest (lines up with Moral worth 
Contributing towards Ends proper conception of end) 
of Medicine Selfish ( desire-driven) No moral worth 
Neutral n/a No moral worth 
Detracting from Ends of n/a Negative moral worth 
Medicine 
Table 3: Applying Plato's Discussion of Leadership-----Action, Motivation and Morality. 
When a physician's actions in the context of his profession detract from the ends of medicine, he 
is committing actions of negative moral worth. When his actions in the context of his profession 
neither contribute to nor detract from the ends of medicine ("neutral"), his actions have no moral 
worth. This moral analysis of actions which do not contribute to the ends of medicine ( either 
because they are neutral or because they detract from those ends) is not unlike the Kantian 
analysis of actions which are not required ( either because they are merely permissible or because 
they are forbidden, see Table 1 ). 
Compare Plato's view of morality with respect to actions that contribute to the ends of 
medicine with Kant's analysis of actions that are required by duty. Plato's view is similar to 
Kant's view in that those actions that contribute· to the ends of medicine which are also done out 
of a desire to fulfill the ends of medicine are morally worthy. However, with respect to actions 
that contribute to the ends of medicine but are done for reasons outside of a desire to fulfill these 
ends (similar to actions done in accordance with duty in Kant's analysis, Table 1), Plato's view 
of morality does not indicate that all of these actions are of no moral worth. In contrast to Kant, 
Plato's argument indicates that actions committed out of self-interest that line up with the proper 
conception of ends are of moral worth. Plato's view discounts those actions that are desire-driven 
and selfishly motivated. 
More specifically, Plato's argument addresses the morality of self-interested motivations 
that are in accordance with the fulfillment of the ends of medicine. In circumstances where all 
have the capacity to fulfill their own interests, self-interested motivations do have moral worth. 
For example, in a situation where everyone has access to quality health care based solely on the 
contractual obligations of physicians, physicians seeking their own self-interest could be morally 
justified. However, if the ends of medicine are to be pursued in a society where medicine is 
distributed through market forces, morality excludes the pursuit of actions within the profession 
of medicine for the sake of selfish reasons. 
The physician's social obligations are grounded in Plato's definition of the ends of 
medicine as the treatment of the sick. In circumstances where this treatment is not equitably 
available, the physician ought to feel morally compelled to sacrifice some of his own self-
interests in the pursuit of the ends of his profession. In a capitalistic society, the ends of medicine 
must be focused on ensuring a minimum standard of health for all individuals. The physician, as 
a leader, must be motivated by a desire to seek the ends of the profession of medicine if she is to 
commit actions of moral worth. 
Chapter four: Motivated to fulfill social obligations out of compassion 
Consider the fate of an indigent wanderer: 
... a fellow from Hildesheim ... Lame and hardly able to move, he was so infested with 
vermin that he had fouled the cloth on which he lay, filling the entire house, yard, and 
everything about him with his stench. The man had been brought to Crusius's place on a 
handcart and dumped on his manure heap. (Neither a barbaric nor symbolic act in itself, 
as the steam from the manure probably prevented him from freezing to death in the raw 
spring weather.) The commune of Hedwigsburg had tried to ship him back to Ohrum, but 
Ohrum refused to accept him. Attempts to fob him off on the nearby villages also failed. 
It was April, and the man 'has been on my back since Easter/ Crusius complained: 'I am 
now at my wit's end.' The issue of what to do was debated back and forth for about a 
week before the problem solved itself: The man had the good grace to die. 
-Karen Geraghty (2005,1) 
The plight of the indigent wanderer and Crusius' reaction are illustrative of the 
failure of compassion to inspire generosity beyond one's moral circle of concern. Compassion 
was not extensive enough to motivate the villagers from Hedwigsburg to care for the foreign 
fellow from Hildesheim. The wanderer's plight may also reveal a broad weakness of duty, 
namely that it is not a good motivator. 
This chapter first explores the failure of compassion to inspire action when it is not 
extensively applied. Secondly, this chapter addresses this weakness of compassion using Martha 
Nussbaum' s concept of compassion within the limits of respect. Finally, this chapter establishes 
the moral worth of compassion as a better motivator than duty. 
The weakness of compassion 
The story of the indigent wanderer raises questions about the reliability of compassion in 
motivating physicians to fulfill their social obligations. In other words, is compassion 
consistently able to motivate physicians to engage in social responsibilities? With respect to the 
reliability of compassion, it could be the case that compassion may only motivate a physician in 
her relationships with her patients and not in the fulfillment of social obligations. However, this 
same compassion that motivates one physician to care for a sick patient may, for other 
physicians, motivate them to engage in social responsibilities. For example, compassion may 
motivate the physician to share her medical knowledge with friends and family when they are in 
need of medical assistance. Compassion may also motivate the physician to provide charity or 
emergency care. When a physician engages in such social responsibilities, she is recognizing that 
her moral circle of concern extends beyond the scope of her paying patients. Thus when_ 
compassion does motivate a physician to engage in social obligations outside the physician-
patient relationship, it is reliable in that it encourages the physician to view her moral community 
in an extensive manner. 
But what of those circumstances when a physician is not motivated out of compassion to 
provide care? In the case of the opening story of the indigent wanderer, Crusius and the villagers 
did not even consider the possibility of providing care for the sick man themselves in so far as 
we can tell. We must wonder, would this lack of consideration have occurred if the sick man had 
been from their own village of Hedwigsburg? Assume that compassionate care for the man 
would have been provided had he been of a member of their own village. If this is the case, this 
story also conveys the confusion in determining morally worthy action when an outsider is 
placed into one's physical circle of concern. 
Critics of compassion claim that it is not applied extensively enough to motivate the 
consistent fulfillment of social responsibilities. Ostensibly, those physicians who are not engaged 
in social obligations are not motivated to fulfill these responsibilities and thereby lack a sense of 
compassion to do so. However, it does not follow from the fact that some physicians are not 
motivated out of compassion to engage in social obligations that compassion is always unreliable 
in inspiring such actions. For example, in the same instance, a physician who does not fulfill her 
social obligations is not motivated by a duty to do so. However, just because a physician does 
not use her medical skills beyond her patients does not mean that she does not have a duty to do 
so. Rather, her conception of what her duty entails as a physician is skewed. In a similar manner, 
just because a physician is not motivated out of compassion to use her medical skills beyond her 
patients, it does not follow that compassion is not a morally worthy motivation. Just as with a 
misconception of duty, one could argue that the physician morally ought to feel compassion to 
fulfill social obligations. 
It follows that duty is a reliable motivation only to the extent that it is properly 
conceptualized. Similarly, compassion is a reliable motivation only to the degree that it is 
extensively applied. In correcting misconceptions of duty, emphasis must be placed on 
redefining the duty of the physician in such a way that social obligations are an accepted and 
integral part of the responsibilities of the physician. In a similar manner, in correcting non-
extensive compassion, emphasis ought to be placed on expanding the scope of compassion so 
that more physicians are thereby motivated to act. Towards these ends, Martha Nussbaum's work 
on Compassion and terror provides a framework in which the moral circle of concern of 
compassion can be expanded (2003). 
Nussbaum and compassion 
In Compassion and terror, Martha Nussbaum develops a claim for the "moral value of 
compassionate imagining" and "the ability of compassion to cross lines of time, place, and 
nation" (2003, 1). She describes the role of compassion in the events of September 1 Ith as 
Americans became aware of the sufferings of people whom they otherwise had thought little 
about. She also hits upon the weakness of compassion as being both "narrow and self-serving" 
(Nussbaum, 2003, 2). Nussbaum's work looks at "the question of what to do about compassion, 
given its obvious importance in shaping the civic imagination, but given, too, its obvious 
propensity for self-serving narrowness" (2003, 2). She contrasts the partiality of compassion with 
the impartial nature of respect for human dignity, the latter motive not unlike the Kantian ideal of 
treating humanity as ends. In proposing a framework in which to minimize compassion's self-
serving weakness, she defends the need for compassion in relationships. 
Nussbaum categorizes four evaluations inherent in demonstrating compassion: 
assessment of the seriousness of a predicament (judgment of seriousness), the extent to which 
one feels someone deserves the suffering (judgment of nondesert), shared vulnerabilities 
(judgment of similar possibilities) and the depth of one's circle of concern (eudaimonistic 
judgment) (2003, 4-5). But how do these specific aspects of compassion come into play in 
motivating a physician to engage in social obligations? 
First, consider specific social obligations such as emergency medical care and the 
provision of charity care. With respect to the judgment of seriousness, an emergency situation is 
defined by serious and urgent need, thus inferring a rating high in the judgment of seriousness 
and encouraging compassionate actions. Furthermore, with charity care one could imagine that 
patients who seek care at clinics even when they do not have the means to pay are probably 
present for more than a routine check-up. In both emergency and charity care when the need is 
acute, it seems that the judgment of seriousness made by a physician would elicit a 
compassionate response. As Edmund Pellegrino put it, "To lack health and to need treatment is 
to be in a diminished state of human existence-a state quite unlike other deprivations which can 
be borne if one is healthy" (1999, 248). 
With the judgment of nondesert, a physician may be more or less inclined to judge the 
individual as deserving of his physical condition. Undoubtedly, there are both genetic and 
behavioral components that make an individual more or less susceptible to disease. However, 
there are illnesses which some physicians may judge to be a direct result of lifestyle choices such 
as obesity due to poor nutrition and lack of exercise, or sexually transmitted diseases due to 
engaging in unprotected sex. On the other hand; with the increasing demand for physicians to 
provide health care in a wholistic manner, a more nuanced perspective that assesses the indirect 
causes of such actions may influence this particular judgment. It is increasingly viewed as the 
physician's responsibility to understand the social context in which she practices as well as the 
social circumstances in which her patients find themselves. The physician's challenge is more 
than a mere accurate diagnosis of an ailment and the subsequent prescription of a quick-fix 
solution. Her challenge is to understand the human being as he resides within a social aggregate, 
and to develop a treatment plan detailing how an individual might integrate aspects of his 
internal and external environment to maintain a healthy equilibrium. The business of healing 
must be integrated into the situations of a patient's life (Koslowski, 1999, 19). As physicians 
seek to be fully aware of the effects of the social and physical environments on the health of their 
patients, they may increasingly attribute behavioral factors related to illness as the partial result 
of environmental circumstances. Such an analysis may cause physicians to rate the patient low in 
deserving illness and thus be more inclined to provide care out of compassion. 
The third evaluative aspect of compassion, the judgment of shared possibilities, is likely 
to be ranked especially high by all individuals in the context of health care. Everyone, including 
physicians themselves, can imagine what it is like to be a patient. As Churchill states, "In the 
needs of others we see ourselves, recognize our own neediness, and acknowledge our own 
vulnerability'' (1987, 69). Within the physician-patient relationship, the patient is particularly 
vulnerable, exposing his physical body and mental state to the physician. The ability of everyone 
to understand this sensation through commonality of experience allows the observer, including 
the physician, to share in the patient's vulnerability. Particularly with respect to health, the 
judgment of shared possibilities is likely to be rated especially high and thus contribute to 
compassionate motivation. 
As sho'Ml, a compelling case can be made for reasons why physicians might rate the first 
three judgments offered by Nussbaum particularly high with respect to their provision of charity 
or emergency care, and thus be likely to be motivated out of compassion. This ethical analysis 
provides one explanation for why compassion was the predominant motivation in the free 
provision of services by medical professionals at Crossover Ministry. However, Nussbaum's 
fourth evaluation of eudaimonistic judgment does not as clearly contribute to the likelihood of 
compassion as a motivation to volunteer. Therefore, eudaimonistic judgment might be a key 
point of additional concern in inspiring the fulfillment of social obligations out of compassion. 
Eudaimonistic judgment as defined by Nussbaum refers to an individual's social scope of 
concern. Eudaimonistic judgment highlights in-group and out-group distinctions, and when less 
than universal in scope, may not be broad enough to elicit compassion for humanity far removed 
from one's close relationships. In this evaluation, particularly for the physician, there is great 
concern that compassion's self-serving narrowness may shine through. As Jonathan Glover 
states, "The sympathies which really engage us are often stubbornly limited and local. I may 
move mountains for my child, but perhaps I will not cross the street to be a good Samaritan to a 
stranger. Sympathy may hardly extend to those outside a particular community" (1999, 28). For 
compassion to motivate a physician to engage in social obligations, she must consider her circle 
of concern to extend beyond just her patients to encompass at least her immediate community 
and even the entire globe. 
Such morally extensive compassion motivated the Good Samaritan to exhibit compassion 
in caring for a fellow human being by the roadside. Yet, as Churchill points out, "The perception 
of the Samaritan was ofa fellow human being, a neighbor, and his virtue lay not only in the 
helping acts he perf onned but in the perception that he was of one fabric with the beaten man in 
the road" (1987, 69). What is most admirable about the Samaritan's actions is not the fact that he 
chose to help, but rather whom he chose to help. The Good Samaritan demonstrated an extensive 
moral concern and indicated "a primal recognition of self in [the] perception of others" 
(Churchill, 1987, 69). Given compassion's strong role in the civic imagination, greater attention 
to this fourth evaluative factor could further extend the reaches of compassion in motivating 
physicians to fulfill social obligations. 
One way of addressing low ratings of eudaimonistic judgment relies on Nussbaum 's 
solution of"compassion within the limits of respect" (2003, 11). She suggests that, "the 
education of emotion, to succeed at all, needs to take place in a culture of ethical criticism, and 
especially self-criticism, in which ideas of equal respect for humanity will be active players in 
the effort to curtail the excesses of the greedy self' (2003, 11 ). As suggested by Nussbaum, this 
education must begin at an early age when "Children should learn to be tragic spectators and to 
understand with subtlety and responsiveness the predicaments to which human life is prone" 
(2003, 11). If compassion is to motivate physicians to engage in social responsibilities, it must 
become part of the medical education of society. Furthermore, critical attention must be paid in 
the demonstration of compassion, ensuring that one's circle of concern is morally extensive. For 
example, a physician ought to be critically aware of those situations which do and do not elicit 
compassionate action that inspires him to volunteer. As Churchill states, "circumstances of 
proximity will undoubtedly lead us naturally to extend our sympathy to some more than others" 
and further, "it is not self-evident that ties of proximity in age, sex, status, or blood are reliable 
guides for our choices. The simple solution (but not necessarily the most just) is to help those 
who are immediately before us while refusing to admit that we have made a choice at all" (1987, 
69). Ethical criticism must recognize that individuals do have agency in determining whom they 
help; self-criticism must consider what is guiding these choices. Greater self-awareness in the 
display of compassion can assist the creation of situations in which physicians rate eudaimonistic 
judgment highly because they place a larger sphere of individuals within their immediate circle 
of concern. 
But just how broad should one's moral circle of concern be? Clearly if compassion is to 
serve as a motivation for physicians to fulfill social responsibilities, it must extend beyond the 
scope of a physician's own patients. However, are there limits to how far compassion can go 
before being watered down in terms of its genuine emotional content of fellow-feeling for 
another? And are there limits which can be placed on compassion that would help to eliminate its 
weakness to serve those closest to oneself? The next section considers how compassion 
motivates Dr. Paul Farmer, a graduate of Harvard's School of Medicine who is actively involved 
in international medicine. 
A picture of compassion within the limits of respect 
Farmer lingers beside the crib of a little girl with wasted arms and a torso bloated by 
pleural effusion-caused by extrapulmonary TB. She lies on her side. He reaches in and 
strokes her shoulder, saying softly, almost singing, in English, "Michela wants to give up, 
but we're not going to let her are we? No, we're not going to let her." 
-Tracy Kidder (2003, 31) 
As Tracy Kidder wrote in his biography of Dr. Paul Farmer entitled Mountains Beyond 
Mountains, "Doctoring is the ultimate source of his power, I think. His basic message is simple: 
This person is sick, and I am a doctor. Everyone, potentially, can understand and sympathize, 
since everyone knows or imagines sickness personally. And it can't be hard for most people to 
imagine what it would be like to have no doctor, no hope of medicine" (2003, 295). Indeed, like 
Farmer, most individuals do rank sickness high in a judgment of similar possibilities. 
Dr. Paul Farmer is a founder of Partners in Health and a MacArthur Foundation Fellow, 
as well as creator of a thriving public health system in Cange, Haiti. An arduous worker, Farmer 
practices medicine both locally and globally in addition to teaching as a professor at Harvard 
Medical School. Kidder describes his impression of Farmer as someone with an ability to 
embrace "a continuity and interconnectedness that exclude[s] no one" (2003, 219). Dr. Farmer's 
empathy for others appears limitless as seen in the punishing schedule he keeps and his resolute 
focus on the individual in his goal of improving public health. 
While some would criticize Farmer's use of his time in going to great lengths to treat 
individual patients, this aspect of the care he provides is evidence of his philosophy that no one 
patient is more important than another. As Kidder quoted Farmer's colleague as saying, 
"Farmer's still going to make these hikes ... because if you say that seven hours is too long to 
walk for two families of patients, you're saying that their lives matter less than some others', and 
the idea that some lives matter less is the root of all that's wrong with the world" (2003, 294). 
For Paul Farmer, his priorities begin and end with the individual, and his compassion has 
motivated him to make many sacrifices in order to improve the quality of health of individuals. 
Though a strong public health advocate whose practice takes him beyond the strict 
confines of medical knowledge into the social environment in which illnesses develop, Farmer is 
unlike many public health officials in that he would disagree that stopping the transmission of a 
disease is more important that curing individuals. In fact, he views paying attention to individual 
patients as a moral imperative (Kidder, 2003, 146). Furthermore, Farmer has an uncanny ability 
to channel his compassion in such a way that he is moved to help anyone in need. Farmer's 
compassion fuels his practice of medicine in such a way that his concern for all of humanity is 
demonstrated in his passionate generosity towards individuals. Farmer's brand of compassion is 
peculiarly both impartial in its global view of his moral circle of concern and particular in its 
emphasis on helping at the individual level. 
Farmer's demonstration of impartial compassion exemplifies Nussbaum' s call for 
compassion within the limits of respect. Physicians should be morally encouraged to exhibit 
impartial compassion, demonstrating impartiality in identifying their circle of concern while 
simultaneously maintaining a sort of particularism in their specific interactions with others. The 
particularistic nature of this impartial compassion contributes an emotional care for others that 
impartiality alone cannot. Impartial compassion allows the demonstration of compassion to be 
abstract enough to inspire action towards any number of individuals, but specific enough to 
incite fellow-feeling towards the one being helped. Impartial compassion motivates Farmer's 
work, inspiring him to touch individual lives with his ability to heal. 
Distinguishing between different kinds of social obligations 
While both Farmer's work and the Crossover study primarily address the role of 
compassion in the provision of charity care, these examples fail to address the broader role of 
compassion in the fulfillment of other social obligations of physicians. One might wonder: how 
does compassion motivate physicians to engage in social obligations outside of providing care to 
individual patients? For example, can compassion motivate physicians to serve on ethics 
committees, to train new physicians, or to engage in research? While the role of compassion in 
the relational aspects of social obligations seems poignant, one must question whether or not 
compassion is both reliable enough and strong enough to elicit this sort of engagement without 
direct emphasis on patients in need. 
It follows that there is an important distinction to be made between the various kinds of 
social obligations which may or may not be appropriately motivated by compassion. While 
providing indigent or emergency care-aspects of social obligations which are relational in 
nature-is often driven by compassion, serving on ethics committees or training future 
physicians or engaging in clinical research may seem less relevant to the motivation of 
compassion. This distinction is found not only in the relational quality of the first group of 
obligations but also in the concrete and pressing human need evidenced in this first group. It is 
the urgency that accompanies the provision of health care to sick individuals as well as the 
dignity of the individual readily felt through personal interaction that set these actions apart from 
other obligations. 
Given these constraints on compassion, it may be that duty can serve as a motivation for 
a larger sphere of obligations (including both the relational social obligations as well as other 
non-relational obligations) and may thereby be deemed of greater moral worth. However, in the 
actions that both duty and compassion do promote, we must consider if compassion offers 
something morally unique as compared to duty that makes it at least as morally valuable as duty-
based motivations? 
Duty as motivation 
Duty may be considered a more reliable motivation than compassion in some contexts. It, 
unlike compassion, enforces the necessity to engage in actions such as serving on hospital 
committees in addition to providing indigent care, and even when a physician may not be 
emotionally inclined to do so. However, as discussed earlier, duty is reliable to the extent that it 
is properly conceptualized, in the same manner that compassion is reliable to the extent that it is 
extensively applied. But beyond the proper conception of duty, is duty a good motivator? The 
story of the itinerant wanderer at the beginning of this chapter emphasizes an important 
distinction between duty and compassion that is helpful for an elaboration of duty's ability to 
motivate. 
In order to discuss duty as motivation with respect to the story of the itinerant wanderer, 
we must first establish if Crusius and his community feel some sort of obligation towards this 
sick individual. The story seems to indicate that they did feel a duty towards the fellow from 
Hildesheim. After all, they did not move him from the manure heap of Crusius' backyard to the 
outskirts of the city, or even leave him alone to perish at sea. Rather, though Crusius and his 
fellow townsmen were not enthused to care for the man themselves, they were conscientious 
enough not to neglect some duty they had towards the man given his close physical proximity to 
them. Consequently, they attempted to find another village that would accept the responsibility 
to care for the wanderer. The villagers had a strong enough sense of duty to believe that this man 
was owed some help, though perhaps not from themselves. However, their attempts to rid 
themselves of their duty by placing the wanderer out of the scope of their obligations were met 
with failure. 
Though it is evident that Crusius and others in his community felt some sort of obligation 
for the itinerant wanderer, this sense of duty failed to motivate them to care for the sick man. 
Beyond their limited conception of how to best fulfill their duty to help this fellow human being, 
the possibility of providing care for the sick wanderer themselves was not even considered, at 
least as far as we can tell. Instead, time and energy were expended discussing the nuisance of the 
situation and searching for another village that would take the sick man. Cruisus and the villagers 
were duty-bound to do something given the man's close proximity, so they tried to get him out of 
their circle. In this case one must wonder if the effort expended in attempting to rid themselves 
of the man fallen ill had instead been directed in compassionate care, would the man have 
recovered? After all, it was no more than a couple weeks after the man had been placed in 
Cruisus' backyard that he died. 
As Geraghty states, •• ... physicians would do well to remember the fate of the itinerant 
wanderer, whose only misfortune was to fall ill in a community that fought more passionately for 
its policy than it did for its humanity" (2003, 2). The indigent wanderer's misfortune was to find 
himself in poor health amongst people whose passion for humanity was overshadowed by the 
burdens of fulfilling obligations. In this particular case, duty was not a strong enough motivator 
to inspire Crusius and his fell ow villagers to act. 
But is it more often the case that individuals fail to fulfill their social obligations because 
they do not consider it their duty or because they are not compassionately inclined to do so? 
Consider a comparison of duty and compassion in the Crossover Ministry empirical study which 
surveyed medical professionals who fulfill social obligations by providing charity care. 
The role of compassion in inspiring volunteer medical service 
Surveyed medical professionals at CrossOver Ministry expressed the extent to which 
paragraphs describing the motivations of duty, self-interest, compassion and religion closely 
aligned with their own motivations to volunteer their services (Appendix A). Data analysis 
showed that respondents were significantly more likely to indicate that compassion was their 
highest motivation as compared to duty, self-interest or religion. In like manner, when ranking a 
series of paragraphs describing these same four motivations, physicians consistently ranked the 
paragraph about compassion as most compatible with their own motivation. An analysis of 
subscales comprised of statements regarding each of the motivations also demonstrated that the 
level of agreement with the statements of motivation was significantly higher for compassion as 
compared to other motivations. Thus, from three separate measures, survey results indicated that 
compassion was the predominant motivation in volunteering medical services for the respondent 
population. In contrast, respondents indicated duty to be less of a motivator than compassion, 
and not significantly different from the motivations of self-interest and religion. 
In the case of physicians fulfilling social obligations, surely a physician without 
compassion will not act out of compassion in the same way that a physician without a proper 
conception of duty will not act out of duty. But the results of this study indicate that compassion 
does motivate physicians in this case, and is a more likely motivation of physicians in inspiring 
acts of medical volunteerism than duty may be in this and relevantly similar contexts. 
Compassion as motivation 
Compassion demonstrates fellow-feeling through a focus on the alleviation of suffering. 
In many ways, compassion is an extension or demonstration of sympathy, the latter defined by 
Churchill as "an analogous sentiment springing up at the thought of another's situation" ( 1 987, 
63). One imagines what it would be like to experience suffering in a particular situation, and is 
further motivated by a desire to alleviate the suffering of another. 
In the plight of the indigent wanderer, Crusius' intent focus on duty was the result of a 
reasoned conception that the essence of the problem at hand was the necessity to fulfill a duty. 
Had Crusius instead been motivated by compassion to care for the sick man, the definition of the 
problem at hand may have been less cerebral but more sympathetic. Even if some might argue 
that Crusius acted out of a desire to avoid guilt resulting from neglecting duty, his actions were 
rationally executed, with much planning and debating preceding request to other villages to take 
on the sick man. Churchill's analysis of sympathy is particularly poignant in this regard: 
"Sympathy ... does not depend on conscious acts of will, rational assessments of harm or benefit, 
noble purposes, charity, good will, or altruism. It is simply part of the human condition that we 
are sympathetic beings, and it is on this uncalculated and unwilled responsiveness that morality 
depends" ( 1987, 66). A rationalized conception of duty is simply not motivating the way that 
compassion is motivating. Compassion is needed to focus help on specific individuals. 
Demonstration of fellow-feeling through compassion requires a redefinition of the problem in 
such a way that the focus is on the individual suffering rather than on the need to fulfill duty 
regardless of the circumstance, inclination or consequences. 
In determining the manner in which one might fulfill a Kantian broad duty such as the 
duty to help others, Kant does not specify what motivations should guide an individual to help a 
particular person in a particular manner at a particular time. In fulfilling a broad duty to help 
others because it is the right thing to do, there is a critical difference between dispensing of one's 
duty in such a way that it alleviates guilt about neglecting the duty and meeting the obligation in 
such a way that expresses compassion for the individual in need. This distinction is again evident 
in the story of the itinerant wanderer. While Crusius recognizes that he is duty-bound to help the 
sick man, in dispensing of this duty he is more concerned about determining his own 
responsibility to help rather than alleviating the suffering of the sick individual. Crusius been 
motivated out of compassion as opposed to a desire to alleviate guilt, the resulting manner in 
which he would have fulfilled his duty would have made a world of difference to the man fallen 
ill. This realization raises an important question: what is it that compassion contributes to the 
fulfillment of social obligations that duty alone cannot? 
For Kant, actions committed out of compassion fall under the category of actions 
performed in accordance with duty. As such, they have no Kantian moral worth. Because 
compassion as a primary motivation is discounted as heteronomous by Kant, it may seem that his 
framework does not allow for the allotment of any moral worth to compassion. However, does 
Kant's framework allow space for the moral grounding of compassion as a secondary motivation 
in the determination of how to go about fulfilling broad, Kantian duties? 
Within the context of fulfilling broad duties, it may be possible to justify the potential 
moral worth of impartial compassion within the Kantian framework. As addressed in the second 
chapter of this thesis on duty, physicians' social obligations fall under the category of broad, 
meritorious duties according to Kant. Further recall that in Kant's description of broad duties, 
including the duty to help one another, he allows for flexibility in the time and manner in which 
such duties are fulfilled. Kant stipulates that broad duties are arrived at through application of the 
categorical imperative, and that individuals must be thereby motivated to act. However, beyond 
the role of motivation in designating the moral worth of such actions as duties, Kant does not 
stipulate how one ought to be motivated to flexibly fulfill these broad duties. Inevitably in the 
fulfillment of broad duties, there will be choices for the ethical individual to make. Ultimately, 
the choice to help this individual or that individual, or to help at this particular time or that time, 
or to help in this manner or in that manner will be motivated by what Kant calls a heteronomous 
motivation. 
Thus, perhaps there is room for compassion in a Kantian understanding of duty. While it 
is indisputable for Kant that physicians have the broad duty to help people, compassion can serve 
as a powerful indicator of when and how and to whom these duties ought to be fulfilled. For 
example, in the case of Crusius, a demonstration of compassion may have further directed him to 
fulfill his duty to help a fellow man through sympathetic care of the individual rather than 
through attempts to place him in the care of another. In contrast, conceptions of Kantian duty are 
not specific enough to direct the individual to choose how to dispense of broad duties. In 
Crusius' case, duty could be respected by discharging it through care for the sick man or by 
making the duty go away as Crusius attempted to do. In placing the sick man in the realm of 
another village, Crusius' duty would have been relieved because he would have ensured that it 
was someone else's obligation to help the sick man. Whether or not this other individual chose to 
help the sick man would not have been of Crusius' moral concern in a Kantian framework. In 
contrast, compassion applied extensively would only be satisfied by providing care for the sick 
man himself. 
A concern for the fulfillment of social obligations by physicians necessitates a concern 
for those motivations which promote such actions. With respect to the demonstration of fellow-
feeling, compassion which elicits completing social responsibilities is a morally worthy 
motivation. However, in order for compassion to be a reliable motivation towards the ends of 
meeting social obligations, it must be cultivated within the limits of respect. The creation of a 
culture of ethical criticism, and particularly self-criticism, is instrumental towards increasing the 
reliability of compassion as a morally worthy motivation. Furthermore, in an increasingly global 
world, the demonstration of impartial compassion with a particular emphasis on the individual 
will continue to further the moral scope of concern of compassion while maintaining its unique 
contribution as an expression of fellow-feeling. 
Chapter five: Motivated to fulfill social obligations out of Christian beliefs 
All the great religious traditions of the world say, Love thy neighbor as thyself. I'm sorry, 
I can't, but I'm going to keep on trying. 
-Dr. Paul Farmer quoted in Tracy Kidder's 
Mountains Beyond Mountains (2003, 213) 
Dr. Farmer's statement recognizes both the duty to love one's neighbor as oneself 
emphasized in many religious traditions and the near impossibility of completely attaining such a 
goal. Paul Farmer's commitment to the ongoing battle of improving public health raises the 
question: what drives religious people to strive consistently for what may appear to be 
unattainable? More important for this thesis, is religious belief even a morally worthy motivation 
in the fulfillment of social responsibilities? 
Religion as a Kantian heteronomous influence 
For Kant, duty is determined by reasoned application of the categorical imperatives and 
the moral worth of an action is based on the sense of duty behind it. Though many people might 
feel duty-bound to act a certain way throughout life, there are many other ways that people 
conceptualize these obligations outside of the application of Kant's categorical imperatives. For 
example, people might define their responsibilities in terms of their culture, the political law of 
their state, or the religious dogmas to which they are committed. Such influences on duty would 
be considered heteronomous according to Kant, because something other than reason itself is 
prescribing duties such as social norms, government, religious leaders or even God. The 
heteronomous nature of religion may lead us to consider Kantian thought as directly opposed to 
religious beliefs. For example, Ronald Green writes: "Kant, the rationalist foe of all religious 
enthusiasm and emotion in the moral life, the advocate of unflinching devotion to duty, does not 
strike one as a thinker likely to understand the meaning of religiously inspired, self-emptying 
love" (1992, 261 ). 
But though Kant would reject the grounding of the social obligations of physicians in a 
conception of duty that is not purely reasoned, as could be the case in instances of religious duty, 
the heteronomous determination of duty may have implications for the moral worth of 
motivations. To the extent that religious grounding of physicians' social obligations lines up with 
Kantian duty, in other words insofar as religion tells people the right thing to do, there may be 
cases where religious beliefs inspire the fulfillment of duty much as the morally worthy 
motivations of compassion and self-interest do. Thus, this chapter considers the moral worth of 
religious beliefs that inspire the fulfillment of duty and are thereby in accordance with duty. 
While this chapter seeks to investigate the fulfillment of social obligations based on 
Christianity, the author recognizes that many of the fundamental motivations discussed herein 
apply to a wide variety of belief systems in addition to Christianity. However, in the interest of 
exploring the predominant religious motivation espoused by the Crossover Ministry physicians 
surveyed as part of this thesis, the author has chosen to highlight the grounds and motivations of 
social obligations from a Christian perspective. 
Section one of this chapter explores the grounds of physicians' social obligations 
according to Christianity. Section two considers Christian love in the context of Kantian thought. 
Section three explores the extent to which religion actually motivates physicians to engage in 
social obligations. Section four considers religion as instrumental in activating self-interested 
motivations. Finally, section five considers religion as instrumental in activating compassionate 
motivations. 
The grounds of physicians' social obligations according to Christianity 
The grounding of physicians' social obligations from the Christian tradition may develop 
from a variety of sources such as biblical doctrine, tradition, personal experience and Christian 
community. This section looks at the grounds of physicians' social obligations specifically with 
respect to biblical doctrine, the standard of faith and practice for many Christians. One way to 
ground these obligations would be in terms of the love commandments expressed in the 
canonical gospels. 
The love commandments are often taken to be fundamental to Christian beliefs because 
Jesus Christ uses them to distill the law of the Old Testament into two duties, namely, "'You 
shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind"' 
and '"You shall love your neighbor as yourself" (Matthew 22:37, 39, NRSV). Many Christians 
believe that these love commandments encapsulate the responsibility of the Christian as given by 
God. In the words of Jesus Christ, "'On these two commandments hang all the law and the 
prophets"' (Matthew 22:40, NRSV). 
But what does it mean to fulfill the first commandment of loving God? The New 
Testament book of I John defines the duty to love God as a duty of obedience: "For the love of 
God is this, that we obey his commandments" (I John 5:3, NRSV). According to I John, the 
Christian's obedience to God's commandments manifests her love for God. In other words, 
obedience to the second commandment to love one's neighbor is a manifestation of love for God. 
As Gene Outka puts it in Agape: An Ethical Analysis, "If one loves God one is not free to decide 
whether to love the neighbor or not" (1991, 44). By this logic, love of God necessitates doing 
God's commandments, and since God commands that one love one's neighbor, love of God 
necessitates love of neighbor. 
With respect to God's love, I John further adds: 
Beloved, let us love one another, because love is from God; everyone who loves is born 
of God and knows God. Whosoever does not love does not know God, for God is love. 
God's love was revealed among us in this way: God sent his only Son into the world so 
that we might live through him. In this is love, not that we loved God but that he loved us 
and sent his Son to be the atoning sacrifice for our sins. Beloved, since God loved us so 
much, we also ought to love one another. No one has ever seen God; ifwe love one 
another, God lives in us, and his love is perfected in us. Those who say, "I love God," 
and hate their brothers or sisters, are liars; for those who do not love a brother or sister 
whom they have seen, cannot love God whom they have not seen. The commandment we 
have from him is this: those who love God must love their brothers and sisters also. By 
this we know that we love the children of God, when we love God and obey his 
commandments. (I John 4:7-12, 20-21; 5:2, NRSV) 
According to I John, love is from God and was revealed to man in the sacrifice of Jesus 
Christ in the crucifixion. Love, first and foremost, is not that humans express love for God but 
that God first demonstrated his love towards humanity through the sacrifice of Jesus Christ. As 
Douglas Hicks puts it: "God's equal love is extended universally-as equal love for all people" 
(2000, 153). The obligation to love one's neighbor is thus a response to this demonstration of 
equal love by God in the sacrifice of Jesus Christ. At root, much as God expressed love through 
giving, genuine Christian love that follows suit is demonstrated through giving. Thus, Christian 
biblical doctrine can ground the physician's social obligations in the responsibility to 
demonstrate love for one's neighbor via giving and in response to God's demonstration oflove. 
But to whom, exactly, must the Christian demonstrate love? In other words, who is one's 
neighbor, or how big is one's "neighborhood"? 
Equal regard 
Christian love expressed as love for God and love for neighbor is often referred to in 
Christian circles by the Greek word agape. One of Gene Outka's four distinguishing 
characteristics of agape or Christian love is that of equal regard (1967, 9-24). As Gene Outka 
defines agape, it is ''a regard for the neighbor which in crucial respects is independent and 
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unalterable. To these features there is a corollary: the regard is for every person qua human 
existent, to be distinguished from those special traits, actions, etc., which distinguish particular 
personalities from each other" (1967, 9). In other words, agape as Christian love is extensive in 
its regard for every person as a human being rather than regard for any person in particular. 
Thus, there is a sense of the equality of all humans before God that must be evident in a 
demonstration of agape. 
With respect to the condition of equal regard, in Inequality and Christian Ethics Douglas 
Hicks writes, "The proper response to God's gratuitous acts of love is to be in solidarity with 
human beings, all of whom are equals" (2000, 160). Thus, echoing I John's interpretation of 
agape, agape is a response to God's gift in the sacrifice of Jesus Christ, and is properly 
demonstrated as impartial solidarity with all human beings who are inherently equal. 
As Douglas Hicks further adds, uHow Christians interpret the 'meaning' of equality is 
closely related to a wider theological question: what kind of involvement should Christians have 
in the 'world's problems'?" (2000, 85). Many theologians and ethicists disagree about how 
Christianity should look in the twenty-first century. Some promote a Christianity that focuses on 
loving God without being side-tracked by the cares of the world, whereas others promote a 
Christianity that is actively engaged in transforming the world through its beliefs (Hicks, 2000, 
85). Such beliefs might cause one to think that 'neighbor' in the context of the love 
commandments means something relatively narrow (although perhaps somewhat broader today 
given the effects of globalization). However, the concept of equal regard emphasizing the 
extensive nature of agape suggests otherwise. 
Furthermore, another look at the parable of the Good Samaritan discussed in chapter four 
of this thesis on compassion is particularly helpful in supporting an understanding of an 
extensive moral circle of concern. The parable of the Good Samaritan emphasizes that 
appropriate fulfillment of the commandment to love one's neighbor is evidenced in helping other 
individuals in need, not because they are of the same faith, but because they are also part of 
humanity. 
The parable of the good Samaritan: Who is my neighbor? 
The parable of the Good Samaritan found in the canonical gospel of Luke follows Jesus 
Christ's description of the love commandments (Luke 10:25-37, NRSV). This same parable, 
which follows below, is Jesus' response to the question posed by the lawyer in the record, 
namely, "Who is my neighbor?" 
A man was going down from Jerusalem to Jericho, and fell into the hands of robbers, 
who stripped him, beat him, and went away, leaving him half dead. Now by chance a 
priest was going down that road; and when he saw he passed by on the other side. So 
likewise a Levite, when he came to the place and saw him, passed by on the other side. 
But a Samaritan while traveling came near him; and when he saw him, he was moved 
with pity. He went to him and bandaged his wounds, having poured oil and wine on 
them. Then he put him on his own animal, brought him to an inn, and took care of him. 
The next day he took out two denarii, gave them to the innkeeper, and said, 'Take care of 
him; and when I come back, I will repay you whatever more you spend.' 
Luke 10:30-35 (NRSV) 
When asked which of the three was neighbor to the man who fell into the hands of robbers, the 
lawyer asserts that it was "the one who showed mercy," in other words, the Samaritan (Luke 
10:36, NRSV). Jesus exhorts the lawyer to emulate the actions of the one who showed mercy by 
telling him to "Go and do likewise" (Luke 10:37b, NRSV). Jesus' exhortation affirms that it was 
the actions of the Samaritan in the parable that correctly demonstrate the answer to the question, 
"Who is my neighbor?" What made the Samaritan place the man by the side of the road into his 
own circle of concern was not commonality of religion, race or interest, but the fact that the 

individual was also human. Simply put, the man fallen into the hands of robbers was the 
Samaritan's neighbor by virtue of his humanity. 
Given Jesus Christ's proclamation of the love commandments as well as his illustration 
of the commandments in the parable of the Good Samaritan, Christianity can ground the social 
obligations of physicians in the duty to define their neighborhood extensively and to demonstrate 
love therein. 
Kant and Christian love 
A closer analysis of Kant and his views on Christian love allows for other Kantian 
considerations beyond defining religion as a heteronomous influence. Religion does indeed exert 
a heteronomous influence on duty because it allows for actions to be completed in accord with 
duty rather than allowing reason alone to determine one's duty. But beyond the manner in which 
the Christian duty to love one's Qeighbor is acquired, this duty is not unlike the Kantian 
meritorious duty to help others. As Ronald Green points out in his article "Kant on Christian 
Love," Kant sometimes equates the second commandment of neighbor-love with the idea of 
benevolence or beneficence (1992, 261 ). It is not that Kant disagrees that individuals have an 
obligation to love their neighbor. It is simply that Kant respects this duty as derived from reason 
and not from religious tradition or a higher being. As Green points out: "Christian love for Kant 
represents an injunction to the most perfect fulfillment of rationally understood moral duty" 
(1992, 264). In other words, the formulation of Christian precepts as pure and uncompromising 
is not unlike the Kantian ideal of consistent, 'rationally understood moral duty' that guides action 
despite inclination. Therefore, to the extent that religion supports the rational fulfillment of moral 
duty, there may be room for the Christian conception of neighborly love in a Kantian framework. 
In Kant's discussion of the Christian duty to love one's neighbor, he interprets this love 
as residing in the will and not in the predilection of feeling. With respect to the first love 
commandment, Kant points out that love of God cannot be motivated by the senses because God 
cannot be physically perceived (Green, 1992, 265). Thus. the duty to love God is not emotionally 
motivated but rather rationally grounded in the fulfillment of a commandment. In the same 
manner, the love commandment to love one's neighbor as oneself cannot logically refer to a love 
dependent upon feeling. The Kantian fundamental belief that 'ought implies can' means that "the 
command to love the neighbor, understood as a command to develop feelings of compassion or 
concern, would be nonsensical-like a command to enjoy food or music that one finds 
distasteful" (Green, 1992, 263). An understanding of love of neighbor linked to compassionate 
feeling or concern is nonsensical for Kant because emotion cannot be commanded. For example, 
love as an inclination cannot be commanded, for we do not have control over who we are 
inclined to love. In part for this reason, Kant does not base the moral worth of actions on innate 
characteristics that motivate. Whether or not I feel sympathy or love for an individual is not in 
my control. We can only be obligated to do what is indeed possible to do via reasoned action. 
Therefore in applying Kant's conception of 'ought versus can,' neighborly love is not "a matter 
of sentiment" but rather "a practical commitment to forms of conducf' (Green, 1992, 265). 
This reasoned interpretation of Christian love according to Kantian thought ensures that 
the application of the duty to love one's neighbor exerts a normative pull on the rational actor. 
Rather than neighborly love simply motivating an individual out of compassion to act, Kant 
distinguishes commitment to duty, in this case certain "forms of conduct,' as the constant 
determination of moral worth (Green, 1992, 265). 
It may be the case that the Kantian version of Christian love lacks the richness of 
interpretations that highlight other-regarding feelings in the expression of Christian love, or the 
derivative nature of neighborly love as a demonstration of love for God. After all, Kant's 
interpretation of neighbor-love promotes beneficence as reasoned moral action rather than other-
regarding feeling. Such a Kantian view of motivation discounts the moral worth of 
compassionate motivations that may stem from religious beliefs. Additionally, Kant eliminates 
the vertical element of a relationship with God that informs agape. Essentially, Kant does not 
accept any significant contribution of love of God in informing the horizontal realm of the 
ethical (Green, 1992, 265). 
Though Kant appreciates the morally imperative nature of Christian principles, he does 
not consider religious beliefs to be morally motivating any more than compassion or self-interest 
is morally motivating. But within the category of actions performed in accordance with duty, can 
religious motivations hold moral worth? Does religious motivation motivate individuals to act in 
a way that duty alone cannot? Consider, again, the parable of the Good Samaritan. 
Religious motivation 
Interestingly, the parable of the Good Samaritan opens by pointing out that two religious 
leaders, a priest (a high religious leader among the Jews) and a Levite (the designated lay-
associate of the priest), failed to demonstrate neighborly love (New Oxford Annotated Bible, 
NT98). It is the third passer-by, the foreign Samaritan who was not expected to have 
compassion upon the Jews, who demonstrates neighborly love by caring for the harmed 
individual. So it turns out an extensive moral circle of concern is evident in the actions of 
someone outside the Judean religious circle, and that Jesus Christ is further praising these actions 
as exemplary even though they are not founded in a love for God. 
The parable of the Good Samaritan also highlights the weakness of duty broadly 
understood to motivate individuals to act, a weakness discussed in chapter four of this thesis on 
compassionate motivation. Though the Levite and the priest had a religious duty to love their 
neighbor, neither was motivated to do so in this situation. Thus, one could equally say that 
religious duty exhibits the same weakness. From Jesus Christ's meaning of the parable to the 
lawyer, it is clear that the individual who demonstrates love for neighbor in such a situation is 
worthy of praise and that his actions ought to be emulated by the Christian. In other words, a 
proper conception of the duty to love one's neighbor in such a situation morally requires the 
Christian to stop to provide help. Jesus Christ's parable points out the failure of the Levite and 
the priest to act in contrast to the Samaritan's compassionate actions. Though there is no 
indication that the Samaritan felt a religious duty to help the man by the side of the road, he was 
motivated out of compassion to provide assistance while the religious leaders were not. 
But why, exactly, was religious duty not a strong enough motivator to inspire the Levite 
or the priest to demonstrate love for neighbor? Did these leaders wrongly believe that their duty 
to love their neighbor did not require them to help the man in this situation? Or did these leaders 
properly conceptualize their duty to help and simultaneously feel unmotivated to act? In other 
words, what caused the Levite and the priest to decide that they should not stop to help the man 
by the roadside? 
Perhaps these leaders of the Judean faith assessed that they had more important things to 
be doing with their time and other strict duties to fulfill that took precedence over such a tragedy 
(Darley and Batson, 1973). In a Kantian sense, they may have recognized a broad duty to love 
theit neighbor, in this case demonstrated by helping the individual, and yet determined that they 
did not need to fulfill this duty at this time, in this manner and with respect to this individual. In 
such a situation, motivations outside duty such as compassion or self-interest must motivate the 
individual who commits actions of moral worth to direct him insofar as how he is to fulfill his 
duty. 
On the other hand, the priest and the Levite may have believed, and wrongly so according 
to Jesus Christ's interpretation of the love commandments, that their other responsibilities made 
them exempt from such a duty to act. As Terry Price writes in his work Understanding Ethical 
Failures in Leadership, these religious leaders may have thought of themselves as different from 
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followers by virtue of righteousness; they may have determined that some important business 
they were on their way to carry out justified not stopping to provide assistance; or they may have 
determined that they were bound to religious norms that would cause them to be concerned about 
coming into contact with a half-dead person (Hoyer and McDaniel, 1990, 327). In any event, for 
all of these hypothetical cases, religiosity effectively prevented the Levite and the priest from 
helping this individual in need. 
The negative influence of religion on action seen in this parable raises an interesting 
point. Like Kant's emphasis on the rational agent who reasons through his duties and is 
motivated by reason, reason ought to hold weight in the determination of morally worthy actions. 
Given that religious beliefs are not derived from Kantian reason, the appropriate fulfillment of 
religious duties still requires reason, in much the same way that application of Kant's categorical 
imperatives requires reason. Though we might be able to fulfill religious duty without reason in 
the same way that compassionate action could cause an individual to fulfill Kantian duty, we 
sometimes need reason to interpret duty in either case. Religious principles must be applied by 
rational agents who reason through their actions rather than basing those actions solely on 
tradition or the societal role in which they find themselves. Religious action must occur in a 
culture of ethical criticism in which beliefs are questioned to the extent that the essence of the 
belief may be re-examined, with the result being a metamorphosis of the belief or a re-embracing 
of the more richly understood belief. 
But even if religious actions are to be reasoned through in a culture of ethical and self-
criticism, can religious beliefs also serve as morally worthy motivation in the fulfillment of duty? 
The parable of the Good Samaritan seems to support the notion that religion is not a strong 
motivational factor in fulfilling the duty to love one's neighbor as oneself. After all, the Levite 
and the priest who ought to have expressed great love for God under the Old Testament Law 
were not subsequently motivated to demonstrate love for neighbor by caring for the man in this 
situation. In contrast, though the Samaritan is not motivated out of a love for God, it is he who is 
moved with pity or compassion to provide assistance to the man. 
Consider some empirical data on the role of religious motivation in inspiring physicians 
to provide charity care. A study published in 2000 by Eliason et al. explored the connection 
between physicians' personal values and the amount of service to the underserved they provide, 
Results of the study indicated that 52% of the 712 physicians who responded provide over 40% 
of their care to the underserved (defined as Medicare, Medicaid or uninsured patients) (Eliason et 
al., 2000, 229). With regards to the motivation of these physicians, findings provided general 
support for the hypothesis that self-transcendent values such as universalism ( defined as 
"motivation to enhance and protect all people") and benevolence ( defined as "motivation to help 
those close to you"} are rated higher by physicians who extend care to the indigent (Eliason et 
al., 2000, 231 }. In other words, self-transcendent values include motivations which are extensive 
or impartial (i.e. universalism) and motivations which are partial (i.e. benevolence). Kant would 
encourage such benevolent actions, and would further support their moral worth to the extent 
that they were motivated out of duty. The research study also indicated that tradition, defined as 
a "desire to maintain customs and religion," was the only value significantly associated with care 
to the underserved (Eliason et al., 2000, 229). The results of this study suggest that many 
physicians who continue to fulfill social obligations by providing charity care also significantly 
value religion. However, this study does not provide any evidence for causation between 
religious motivation and the provision of charity care. 
Consider also the motivations of surveyed physician volunteers at CrossOver Ministry 
who engage in a community effort to provide compassionate, quality health care to the 
uninsured. As the mission statement of Crossover Ministry emphasizes, the physicians who 
volunteer their medical services at this organization are "Providing health care, promoting 
wellness and connecting the talents and resources of the community with those in need in the 
name of Jesus Christ." The centrality of religious belief to the mission of this free clinic is 
exemplary of many free clinics in the United States. Perhaps not surprisingly, over 90% of the 
medical professionals who choose to volunteer their services at such a religiously-driven 
organization identified themselves as religious, and over 85% of all participants as Christian. 
Empirical data from surveys of volunteers at Crossover Ministry indicate that physicians were 
significantly more likely to identify compassion as the motivating factor in their volunteerism 
above the other motivations of duty, self-interest and religious motivation. Furthermore, religious 
motivation was not rated significantly different from the motivations of duty or self-interest. 
Though the sample is highly religious and strongly motivated by compassion, the results of this 
study do not support a causal connection between religious motivation and medical 
volunteerism. 
It may be problematic to generalize the findings of the dominance of compassion in 
inspiring charity care in the CrossOver Ministry study given the high percentage of physicians 
who identify themselves religiously. It may be that religious beliefs are inspiring compassionate 
action , or it may just be that physicians who provide charity care regardless of religious 
background are often motivated out of compassion tt> act. From these two studies, it seems that 
while religion may serve as grounds for the social obligations of many physicians who identify 
themselves religiously , religious belief may or may not directly motivate the fulfillment of social 
obligations . But given the correlation between religion and charity care established in both of 
these studies, are their ways that religion can be instrumental towards inspiring other morally 
worthy motivations such as self-interest or compassion? 
Religious belief and self-interest 
In considering the connection between religion and self-interest, can religious beliefs 
contribute to morally worthy self-interested motivations that inspire people to act? At a most 
basic level, Christian tradition might motivate an individual to act out of a concern for future 
rewards in the after-life. Such actions would be self-interested (and selfish by Plato's account, 
for such motivation is in line with Plato's conception of the selfish motivation of honor) . But 
beyond such motivations focused on the future, the individual of Christian faith may be 
motivated to engage in actions that sustain her identity as a Christian. In this case, motivation to 
engage in helping behavior would be supported by religious beliefs that are instrumental to the 
self-interested concept of Christian identity. Much as with the morally worthy self-interested 
actions of physicians providing charity care because it is their role as physicians, religious 
traditions could support volunteerism as an integral part of religious identity . 
But what makes up religious identity, and more specifically, Christian identity? With its 
historical roots and living traditions, Christianity carries with it a collection of narrative stories 
and draws upon memory and community in its practice of faith. Narratives as found in the pages 
of the Bible as well as in the sketches of personal accounts of past and present believers link the 
moral tradition to the experiences of flesh and bones. As Hervieu-Leger writes with respect to 
religion and memory, the group defines itself"as a lineage of belief' (2000, 125). Thus, to be 
Christian means to become part of a historical lineage of faith, to have one's identity linked to 
the many who have come before and the many who will come after. 
But what are the implications for motivation when one's duty is linked to a community 
identity? As K wame Appiah writes, "if an identity is yours, it may determine certain acts of 
solidarity as valuable, or be an internal part of the specification of your satisfactions and 
enjoyments, or motivate and give meaning to acts of supererogatory kindness" (2005, 25). As 
Appiah elucidates, identity might be linked to solidarity with other individuals who are part of 
the same group, it may determine happiness for an individual, and it may motivate and provide 
meaning behind actions of benevolence. So it appears that religious identity can motivate actions 
in a way that duty cannot. As Appiah further writes: "To adopt an identity, to make it mine, is to 
see it as structuring my way through life" (2005, 24). Identity can serve as a pattern for moral 
action, linking one's own actions to the identity of the group and thereby adding the dimension 
of accountability. Particularly for Christians living in Christian community, there is a sense in 
which they are accountable both to God and to their fellow Christians to uphold the expectations 
of the group in their actions. While such accountability should be secondary to the role of reason 
in determining duty, accountability could motivate individuals to perform the morally worthy 
action even when their account of duty may be misconceptualized. 
To be a Christian carries with it an identity that does not follow from other motivations of 
duty, self-interest and compassion. Believers harbor an understanding of what it means to be a 
Christian, and their actions can be motivated based on their desire to "be Christian." To the 
extent that they identify themselves as such, their actions to help others become part of their own 
identity and thus intrinsically linked to who they are as individuals in the company of society, 
and specifically as part of Christian community. Participation in Christian community sustains 
this identity. As Halbwachs writes, "Even when they correspond to and express the present, the 
ideas of society are always embodied in persons or groups" ( 1925, 188). The embodiment of 
religious tradition in the context of a community of believers offers the opportunity to develop 
human relationships that may sustain and encourage moral practice in a way that duty alone 
cannot. 
If religious tradition, and specifically Christianity, is to inspire helping acts by promoting 
the self-interested motivation of identity, one must ask: what does it mean to be a Christian? The 
traditions of this faith and Christian community sustain such conceptions in a way that Kantian 
duty alone cannot. In applying Kant's categorical imperatives, one might be able to assert that 
one engages in the fulfillment of duty in order to be identified as a rational agent who determines 
morality by reason. Though such a motivation would, of course, be un-Kantian, it is possible to 
conceive of an identity focused on Kant's identification of reason as supreme. One could apply 
Plato's conception of justice to determine that one wanted to be identified as a just person. 
Though these conceptions of identity may be firmly routed in the establishment of morally 
worthy character traits, they are not connected to community in the way that religious 
identification is. It may be that religious communities enhance personal identity in a way that 
duty cannot, thereby motivating individuals to act out of self-interest to preserve that identity. 
Consider also, the role of compassion in religious beliefs. 
Religious belief and compassion 
When [Jesus] went ashore, he saw a great crowd; and he had compassion for them and 
cured their sick. (Matthew 14: 14, NRSV) 
This particular account of Jesus Christ's healing of the sick is representative of many 
accounts in the canonical gospels in which Jesus Christ was motivated out of compassion to act. 
Given the strong relationship between religious identification and volunteerism established in 
both the empirical study of physicians at Crossover Ministry and the study by Eliason et al., how 
can reasoned religious beliefs motivate individuals to act out of compassion? 
One interpretation of the grounding of Christian neighborly love is that obedience to God 
grounds actions that fulfill this duty while compassion motivates. As Edmund Pellegrino and 
David Thomasma clearly state in The Christian virtues in medical practice, while the Christian 
must recognize that compassion is not an exclusive value of the Christian community, the 
distinct manifestation of Christian compassion is rooted first and foremost in what Pellegrino and 
Thomasma take to be a desire to be obedient to a loving heavenly father ( 1996, 87). But beyond 
the duty to demonstrate compassion as love for one's neighbor, is there a way in which religious 
beliefs can ground compassion within the limits of respect which Martha Nussbaum calls for? 
As discussed in chapter four of this thesis on compassion, in Compassion and terror, 
Martha Nussbaum identifies the partiality of compassion as its primary weakness. In addressing 
this critique of compassion, Nussbaum suggests extending the moral circle of compassion within 
the limits of respect. Chapter four appeals to the Kantian conception of duty as one framework 
within which compassion can hold moral worth. A similar appeal to agape and its quality of 
equal regard could support the Christian conception of duty as neighborly love as a basis for 
extending this moral circle of concern. 
In a demonstration of agape, an extensive concern for all persons qua humans must be 
evident as Gene Outka and Douglas Hicks pinpoint. This demonstration of equal regard, first 
evident in God's love for humanity and next striven for by the Christian believer, is indicative of 
solidarity with all human beings. Particularly in the Christian tradition, a sense of a shared past 
as Paul writes in his letter to the Ephesians can increase feelings of solidarity with others: "You 
were ... by nature children of wrath, like everyone else. But God, who is rich.in mercy, out of the 
great love with which he loved us even when we were dead through trespasses, made us alive 
together with Christ-by grace you have been saved" (Ephesians 2: 1, 3-5, NRSV). Christianity 
recognizes the beginning of every human being as a fallen state, as well as God's unmerited, 
divine favor bestowed on humanity in the form of his grace. Compassion inspired by Christian 
beliefs may evaluate all of humanity as sharing in the same vulnerabilities and thereby elicit a 
judgment high in similar possibilities (see c~apter four on compassion for a discussion of 
Nussbaum's four categories of judgment in eliciting compassion). Furthermore, the fundamental 
recognition of God's demonstration of compassion despite a lack of deservingness on the part of 
humanity can ground the believer's demonstration of compassion. As I John later corroborates: 
"We love because he first loved us" (I John 4:19, NRSV). If God loved despite shortcomings and 
irrespective of merit, the Christian's demonstration of compassion in relationships with others is 
grounded in the emulation of God's extensive love. 
Such religious doctrine that grounds a demonstration of agape in a wide moral circle of 
concern can inform the rational agent's demonstration of compassion. It may be that such 
Christian notions of equal regard and divine grace actually inform believers' demonstration of 
compassion, thereby extending their circle of moral concern and making them more likely to act 
out of compassion in situations of need. 
Striving/or the unattainable 
Though Kantian thought insists that 'ought implies can' and thus that what is moral must 
also be attainable, religious ideals are often fraught with the expectation of un-attainability. 
Particularly with Christian thought, the very fact that God bestowed grace upon humanity is 
indicative of the fact that humans will not always act morally, or in Christian terms, all humans 
will sin. Again, the parable of the Good Samaritan highlights this human nature in demonstrating 
that individuals of faith are not always the best at demonstrating love or compassion. The parable 
in this religious context emphasizes the need to recognize neighborly love regardless of who 
might be demonstrating it, and to strive to demonstrate love with the humble attitude that one is 
not always perfect at it. This chapter finds that the demonstration of neighborly love in the 
fulfillment of social obligations by both non-Christian and Christian physicians alike is of great 
moral worth. Not only can religious beliefs inspire the fulfillment of Kantian duty in so far as 
they tell people the right thing to do, religion can also motivate individuals to act out of a self-
interested desire to maintain their identity or out of extensive compassion. 
Significant motivations must drive humans to strive for the 'unattainable.' As Green 
states with regard to Christian love as an impossible possibility, in essence Kant says: 
because of the unyielding stringency of its demand for full moral obedience, the love 
commandment provides a stimulating challenge to the moral life. The Matthean 
commandment, he states, presents an "ideal of holiness" so perfect that it is "unattainable 
by any creature." Nevertheless, in this very purity, the commandment is an "archtype 
which we should strive to approach and to imitate in uninterrupted infinite progress." 
(1992, 266) 
Indeed, as religious communities sustain the formation of Christian identity and biblical doctrine 
places compassion within the limits of respect, the duty to love one's neighbor provides a worthy 
goal for the rational agent. 
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Conclusion: What are morally worthy motivations for physicians fulfilling social obligations? 
Health is a fundamental requirement for the fulfillment of the human potential ... [as well 
as] freedom to act and direct one's life. 
-Edmund Pellegrino (1999, 248) 
As physicians elevate the health of their communities, they are helping to ensure 
preconditions for the rationality of all agents. Physicians' use of their medical skills beyond the 
contractual relationships with their patients continues to be integral towards the end of healthy 
communities, and particularly so in a capitalistic society where health care access is based on 
ability to pay. The non-contractual interactions of physicians with their communities contribute 
towards a minimum standard of health for members of society. Whether physicians are providing 
charity care to individuals who cannot afford it or increasing the quality of medical care 
available to all individuals through such actions as training the next generation of physicians or 
directing public policy, their actions elevate the public health. This baseline of health enables 
individuals to thrive as they pursue their own projects. As individuals flourish, society in tum 
flourishes. 
Beyond establishing the grounds of physicians' social obligations, this thesis has focused 
on the moral question of motivation: bow should physicians be motivated to fulfill social 
obligations? Beginning with Immanuel Kant's Foundations of the metaphysics of morals (1969), 
this thesis found that actions committed out of a sense of duty are of great moral worth. 
However, in contrast to Kant's conception of the moral worth of motivations outside of duty, this 
thesis further argued that the moral worth of duty does not preclude the moral worth of other 
motivations. Specifically, this thesis explored the moral worth of motivations such as self-
interest, compassion and religious motivation that inspire actions in accord with duty. In 
discussing the moral worth of self-interested motivations, this thesis drew from Plato's Republic 
(1993) to determine that self-interested motivations that are not selfish can have moral worth. 
Based upon Martha Nussbaum's Compassion and terror (2003), this thesis also found that 
compassion extensively applied is a morally worthy motivation. Finally, this thesis looked at the 
moral worth of religious motivation using the specific example of Christian motivation. The 
thesis explored the value of religious motivation in inspiring individuals to act out of the morally 
worthy motivations of self-interest and compassion. Specifically, this thesis found that religious 
motivation is morally worthy in its ability to sustain self-interested motivations based on 
religious identity as well as its ability to inspire extensive compassion. The empirical study at 
Crossover Ministry described in this thesis found that physicians are predominately motivated 
by compassion. The moral worth of compassion as determined by this thesis indicates that the 
actions of these medical professionals are morally worthy . 
Often in fulfilling the broad duty to help others, individuals are motivated to act in a 
certain place, in a certain manner and for a particular person for many different reasons. As 
defined in this thesis, to the extent that physicians are motivated to fulfill their social obligations 
out of duty, self-interest, compassion or religious motivation, their actions are morally worthy. 
But how does the moral worth of each of these motivations compare? Is duty of greater 
moral worth than the rest, or is some other motivation of the greatest moral worth? Or is there a 
plateau of moral worth above which all motivations are equally moral? Additional comparisons 
among the four motivations discussed in this thesis must be drawn in order to answer these 
questions. 
Furthermore, though this thesis framed religious motivation in the context of its 
relationship to self-interest and compassion, one might further ask: is religious motivation of 
intrinsic moral worth to the fulfillment of social obligations? And is there really room for pure 
religious motivation in a Kantian framework? Where is the balance between autonomy and 
heteronomy? Can religious motivation be autonomous, or are precepts derived from Christian 
community inevitably heteronomous? For example, there may be a sense in which religious 
individuals can be strengthened by moral discussions within a religious community while still 
maintaining an autonomous frame of reference from which to determine moral action. Further 
exploration of the role of religious motivation in the fulfillment of social obligations is a topic for 
future study. 
Finally, the fact that there was no significant difference between the motivations of duty, 
self-interest or religious motivation in the CrossOver Ministry empirical study highlights the 
complexities of motivation behind human action. Though this thesis separated the motivations of 
duty, self-interest, compassion and religious motivation in order to determine their individual 
moral worth, the many connections between these motivations are indicative of this larger truth. 
Individuals are motivated to fulfill social obligations for many reasons, and it may be that 
motivations working in concert add another dimension to the picture of moral worth. Ultimately, 
an interest in how physicians should be motivated to fulfill social obligations must recognize the 
complexities inherent in motivations which inspire individuals to act 
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Appendix A: Survey of Physicians at Crossover Ministry 
Participant Information 
How long have you volunteered at CrossOver? _________ _ 
How many hours a week do you volunteer at CrossOver? __________ _ 
How many hours a week do you volunteer your medical services outside your commitment to CrossOver? 
How do you identify yourself religiously? ____ _ ______ _ 
Are you retired? Yes No 
Please categorize your practice b_y circling all that apply: 
Rural Urban 
Office-based Patient Care 
Primary Care 
Suburban 
Hospital-based Patient Care 
Specialist 
If specialist, please describe: _______________ _ 
Motivation to Volunteer Medical Services 
Please rate the extent of your agreement with each paragraph using the scale below: 
Strongly Dit gree ~ :;,~ - hat Neutral So~ ewhat Agree Strongly 
Disagree Jlmirmee Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Statement A: "I volunteer my medical services because I believe it is an action valuable in 
and of itself. I do it because I should, and not because of the results. Since I expect other 
physicians to engage in this type of behavior, I ought to do it too." 
Statement B: "I volunteer my medical services because it contributes to my happiness, or it 
makes me a better doctor, or it's part of my identity as a physician." 
Statement C: "I volunteer ·my medical services because I can really sympathize with the 
patients. I am compassionate towards people in need, and I volunteer my services because I am 
genuinely concerned about those less fortunate than I." 
Statement D: "I volunteer my medical services because God has called me to do so, or 
because my faith gives me compassion or a sense of duty to do so. I volunteer because my actions 
are a demonstration of God's love." 
Please rank the above descriptions in order of the best description of your motivation to 
volunteer (1) to the least accurate description (4). 
Statement A Statement B Statement C StatementD 
100 
7 
Please respond to the following statements using the scale below (ifit doesn't apply, leave 
blank). Think about what really motivates you the most. 
Strongly Disagree I Somewqat_ ,_ 1jl'eutral Som;i what Agree 
D~sagree Disagree I A ree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I volunteer my medical services ... 
1) ... because it's my role as a physician. 
2) ... because my faith gives me a sense of compassion. 
3) ... just because it's the right thing to do. 
4) __ ... because I enjoy doing it. 
5) __ ... because I care about people. 
6) ... because I try to act how I expect everyone else to act. 
7) __ ... because my profession looks highly upon volunteering. 
8) __ ... because I want to express God's love and care in all I say and do. 
9) __ ... because people close to me approve of my volunteering. 
10) __ ... because I feel compassion toward people in need. 
11) __ ... because it would be hypocritical of me not to volunteer given my expectations of 
other 
physicians. 
12) __ ... because someone will suffer ifl don't. 
13) __ ... because Dr. Jannuzzi convinced me to. 
14) __ ... because my ministry of care for the sick belongs to God. 
15) __ ... because it makes me a better doctor. 
16) __ ... because I am concerned about those less fortunate than I. 
Strongly 
Agree 
7 
17) __ ... because if I were an uninsured patient, I would want a physician to provide free care 
to me. 
18) __ ... because of the friendships. 
19) __ ... because my faith gives me a sense of duty to do so. 
20) __ ... because it's an action valuable in itself. 
21) __ ... because God has called me to do it. 
22) If other, please describe: 
